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UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED NORMS AND THEIR
APPLICATION IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS:

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLISH AND
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND THEIR

INTERACTION WITH MODERN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATIONt
STANISLAW POMORSKI*AND KRISTIN DEFERT**

INTRODUCTION

Multinational public international law agreements are being increasingly relied upon to deal with a growing number of economic and social
problems which in the past were either exclusively or largely regulated by
national legislation. Their intended domestic regulatory character distinguishes these agreements from the older international treaties.1 Professor
Buergenthal writes convincingly that:
It is therefore readily apparent that in the long run these
agreements can have a significant impact on a given national legal
system. Very little is known, however, about the domestic law consequences of the interaction between these treaties and national
law. The major reason for this is that we are dealing with a relatively recent phenomenon....
What is needed, therefore, is an assessment of the various
ramifications of this development from a comparative law perspec2
tive.
This is particularly true with regard to multinational agreements on human
rights, especially those of fundamental importance and long lasting effects,
such as the United Nation's International Covenants on Human Rights (the
Covenant) .3
t

The study was prepared under a grant from the Ford Foundation.
Professor Pomorski received his LL.B., LL.M., and J.S.D. from the University of Warsaw, Poland. He is presently a professor of law at Rutgers-Camden, State University of New
Jersey School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable critique by Professor
George Ginsburgs. Richard Goldberg, Esq., a former Rutgers-Camden Law School student
and George M. Armstrong, a second year student at the same school, have been very helpful in
the research and preparation of footnotes.
**Ms. Defert received her J.D. from Rutgers-Camden, State University of New Jersey
School of Law. She is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. Buergenthal, Interaction of National Law and Modern Intematzmnal Agreements: Some Introductog, Observations, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233 (1970), and authorities collected therein, at 233 n.1;
Skubiszewski, Pravo PRL a traktaty, RUCH PRAWNIcZY EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICZNY 4 (No.
3, 1972).
2. See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 233.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by resolution 2200 (XXI) of the General Assembly, 16 Dec. 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 49-52,
U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
*
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Such international legislation creates a new situation and perspective in
comparative legal research and imposes new tasks upon scholars of comparative law. First of all, international agreements of the type mentioned above
demonstrate that in spite of social, economic, political, and ideological differences between various states and groups of states, there are certain universally recognized values and norms which may and should be observed in the
various national legal systems. This fund of universally shared ideas, values,
and norms indicates that cultural relativism in comparative legal research is
not without limits. It also indicates that judging several national legal systems by internationally accepted standards has nothing to do with the imposition of the values of one legal and political culture upon another.
Certainly no one should object that his municipal law is evaluated by standards which he has explicitly accepted and undertaken an obligation to observe.
Finally, international agreements of the type discussed indicate that the
current official interpretation of Marxist ideas about the class nature of law
and human rights 4 is not incompatible with the idea of universal norms essential for every contemporary society in the world and hence generally
binding. This, in turn, proves the fallacy of the view, presented by some
comparative lawyers, that legal systems of the Western and Socialist type are
virtually incomparable. 5 The very existence of universally accepted norms
creates the possibility, indeed the practical necessity, of comparison and supplies comparative analysis with meaningful conceptual criteria.
A student of comparative law is thus presented with a new theoretically
exciting and practically significant task: to search for the influence of internationally accepted norms on particular national legal systems, to find out
whether internationally agreed-upon norms have been implemented in domestic laws, and to discover what the forms of such implementation are and
what kind of conditions are favorable or unfavorable for such a process.
The impact which an international agreement can have on a given national legal system certainly depends on many factors. One of the most imresolution 2200 (XXI) of the General Assembly, 16 Dec. 1966 [hereinafter cited as the Covenant], 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
4. See text accompanying note 20-36 znfra.
5. See Eorsi, Comparative Analysis of Socialist and Capitahst Law, 1964 COEXISTENCE 139.
Although Eorsi concludes that comparative law has a role to play between the legal systems of
the Western and Socialist type, it is de minimis. He sees comparative law as being a means of
peaceful competition between social systems, a route to mutual knowledge and understanding,
or merely to satisfy the practical requirements of international trade. Id. at 146, 151. However,
Eorsi indicates that the systems are virtually incomparable on any substantive level when he
says:
The possibility of comparison arises only where phenomenon to be compared are variants which can be subsumed-from a certain point of view-under a common primary category. They have, at the same time, both common and different
characteristics. In the Western world this common primary category is the law of
private property ....
Id. at 141. The only common ground Eorsi finds between the Western and Socialist countries is
a desire for peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic competition. Eorsi's statement that
there is no "direct" common ground for a comparison between the law of West and East, id. at
145, may be refuted by viewing the universally accepted standards on human rights as that
common ground.

1980]

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW

portant is an international system of adjudication of governmental and
private complaints seeking redress for violations of rights guaranteed by an
agreement. 6 International adjudication provides not only an immediate
7
means of pressure for change on a state whose domestic law is challenged,
but it may have at least two additional side-effects as well: (1) it represents a
means of indirect pressure on those State Parties which have similarly objectionable legal institutions in their systems; and (2) it establishes an authoritative interpretation of an international instrument and hence makes its
standards clearer and more visible.
None of the aforesaid is present in those cases where an international
system of adjudication does not exist and where the whole machinery for
implementation is weak, as is the case of the U.N. International Covenants
on Human Rights. 8 One of the negative effects of such a situation is that the
very meaning of the internationally established standards remains unclear
and hence their violations, if alleged, usually remain unverifiable. Under
such circumstances, studies of comparative law may be of some special practical service.
6. The experience of the European Convention of Human Rights supports this thesis in
full. Ste Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at
Rome, 4 Nov. 1950; entered into force on 3 Sept. 1953, Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Texts, sec. 1, doc. 1 (7th ed. Strasbourg, 1971) [hereinafter
cited as the European Convention]. See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 234.
7. Such a direct impact has been demonstrated by several writers on the European Convention. See generally Khol, The Influence of the Human Rights Convention on Austrian Law, 18 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 237 (1970); Velu, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in Belgian Law, 18
AM. J. COMP. L. 259 (1970).
8. The Covenant lacks any provision containing strong compulsory implementation or
policing measures. It provides for a reporting system from the states to the Human Rights
Committee, the prime body for enforcement, whose functions are restricted to receiving the
reports and reporting back facts. The Human Rights Committee maintains no adjudicatory
function. See Korey, The Key to Human Rights-Implementation, 570 INT'L CONCILIATION 1, 54-55
(Nov. 1968).
For those states which have accepted its optional provisions, the Covenant provides for an
exchange of written communications about alleged violations, the possibility of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission to handle interstate complaints, and summary reports to the General Assembly. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 43 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 21, 26-27 (1968-69).
All conciliation provisions within the Covenant are optional, and may be withdrawn by the
states. Korey, supra, at 55.
States which ratify the Covenant and satisfy themselves that their law is generally in accordance with its provisions, need not fear that an international judicial body may decide that
they are guilty of violating their obligations. The Covenant conferred no such power on the
Human Rights Committee or the Conciliation Commission which may be established under
art. 42. In fact, examination of a complaint by the U.N. machinery will result in an exchange of
correspondence between U.N. organs and the foreign ministry of the state concerned. Robertson, supra, at 26-27.
One highly authoritative scholar characterized the Covenant provisions for implementation, as opposed to the European Convention on Human Rights, as "extremely weak."
Humphrey, The Revolution in the InternationalLaw of Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 212
(1975). Other writers have found that the system is disappointing, retrogressive, and defective.
Bilder, Rethiking InternationalHuman Rights.- Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 171, 20712; Korey, supra, at 55; Nanda, lmplementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations,21 DE PAUL L. REv. 271, 317 (1971).
These opinions have been forcefully endorsed by the activities at the Human Rights Committee, the 18 member body elected by 38 parties to the Covenant on September 23, 1976. See
Mower, Organizigto Implement the UN. Civil and PolittcalRihts Covenant: FirstSteps by the Committee, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 122 (1978).
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It should be their task to reconstruct the meaning of internationally established norms, to work out the standards to be met by the State Parties,
and finally to confront them with a given national system of legislative and
enforcement patterns. In a sense, legal writers can become at least a partial
substitute for the presently nonexistent mechanism of adjudication. To fulfill this function it is necessary to focus on narrow issues instead of dealing
9
with broad philosophical and anthropological 'human rights questions.
The present project analyzes the Polish and American penal systems
from the point of view of certain selected norms of international legislation
on human rights,' ° primarily those included in the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."'
The criminal law systems seem to be particularly interesting as the subject matter for such an analysis: Poland codified anew its entire penal law
quite recently (1969-1971),12 and a significant part of the drafting and redrafting process took place soon after the adoption of the Covenant by the
U.N. General Assembly in December 1966.13 And intensive process of reform and codification of American criminal law has been going on approximately since the beginning of the 1960s. Several American jurisdictions
have adopted new criminal codes or prepared drafts of new codes. 1 4 Therefore, it seemed quite obvious at the inception of the project that both in
Poland and in the United States the codification and reform process could
be related to, and could have been influenced by, the Covenant.
The systems under consideration are divergent in several respects.
Their special economic, political, and ideological background are different.
They also have different legal traditions and hence show substantial differences in their legal techniques. In spite of the above mentioned divergencies,
the systems under consideration are supposed to implement certain common
and universally accepted ideals, values, and norms.
Two basic questions have guided our research: First, to what extent, if
any, has the Covenant actually influenced American and Polish penal systems? Second, to what extent are American and Polish penal systems, in
their present shape, compatible with the standards provided for by the Covenant? So not to spread our efforts thin, we decided to limit the inquiry on
9. Literature on human rights is full of general works whereas specific issues have remained largely neglected. Therefore, as it was correctly pointed out, ". . . one of the most
urgent tasks confronting human rights advocates today is that of formulating and analyzing the
standards prescribed in the Covenant." Hassan, The InternationalCovenantsfor Human Rights. An
Approach to Interpretation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 35 (1969-70).
10. This approach is thus markedly more narrow in scope than some recent scholarly attempts at assessing whole national legal systems from the perspective of internationally established standards on human rights. See generally M. HAUSER, MENSCHENRECHTE IM
SOWJETSYSTEM (1973); K. MUNGER, BURGERLICHE UND POLITISCHE RECHTE IN WELTPAKT
DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN UND IM SCHWEIZERISCHEN RECHT (1973).

It. See the Covenant, supra note 3.
12. See note 66 in/a and accompanying text.
13. The Covenant, supra note 3.
14. As of April 1979, 36 jurisdictions have revised their penal codes, six completed the
revision which was not yet enacted, and three were in various stages of, or were contemplating,
revision. Six jurisdictions had comp~etd revision which failed to be enacted and two had no
over-all revision planned. The American Law Institute, Annual Report, 56th Annual Meeting,
15 May, 1979.
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the second question to whether the penal systems under consideration are
compatible with the standards established by the Covenant in: article 9
(freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention); and article 14, section 5 (the
right to appeal in criminal cases).
Our research on the first basic question has not established any positive
evidence of the influence the Covenant has had on American penal law reform. Several factors may have been responsible for that:
(1) The main responsibility in the area of criminal law is on the
states,15 whereas foreign relations are entirely within the jurisdiction of the
federal government. The distance between those working on criminal law
reforms on the state level and the international instrument on human rights
adopted by the General Assembly is substantial and may have reduced the
concern about adjusting municipal criminal law to requirements of international law.
(2) A previous well known reluctance on the part of the U.S. Congress
to undertake international obligations in the area of human rights,' 6 made
15. Status quo recognition of states' responsibility for substantive criminal law legislation
has been recently ably challenged. See Myren, Should the United States Adopt a National Substantive
Crimbhal Code for Serious Ofenses, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 103 (1974).
16. This congressional reluctance has created a long history of American verbal assent and
voting agreement with international human rights obligations, usually resulting in non-ratification. Generally, the Congress has "refused . . . international efforts to establish common minimum standards for individual human rights." Henkin, 7he Constitution, Treaties, and International
Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (1968).
Contemporary examples include congressional failure to ratify the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1954) and the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. The Genocide Convention received wide support, in particular during the
period following the Second World War, from both the American delegate to the General Assembly and President Truman who "forwarded it to the Senate, urging it to advise and consent
to ratification." V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY 130 (1970).
Primarily because of strong pressure from the American Bar Association, interest groups,
and a group in the Senate lead by Senator Bricker, "Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
announced in 1953 that the United States would not sign or ratify any covenant on human
rights." Id. See generally Bitker, The Constitutionah'ty ofInternational Agreements on Human Rights, 12
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 279, 290-91 (1972). The Covention on the Political Rights of Women
was also rejected during this period.
Renewed interest, fostered ten years later by the Kennedy administration, met a similar
fate. Both the Convention on the Political Rights of Women on the Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor were denied consent to ratification by the Senate. The Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery was the only human rights agreement recently approved by the Senate and formally
ratified by the United States; delayed II years after the time the Convention was approved by
the U.N. General Assembly. V. VAN DYKE, supra, at 131. In spite of American signature on the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratification similarly has
not been forthcoming. Id. at 109-10. In sum, Congress has "attach[ed] little urgency to the
issue" of international human rights. Id. at 245.
When the fear that ratification of such international treaties might establish a basis for
international scrutiny of domestic human rights issues, such as racial discrimination, was dissipated, with the eradication of some of the worst injustices due to the civil rights movement, the
climate for ratification of these multilateral treaties became improved. Weissbrodt, Human
Rights Legislation and US Foreign Poliy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 235-37 n.26 (1977). In
1974, a congressional committee listed 29 human rights conventions which the U.S. had not
ratified and recommended immediate ratification. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ORGANIZATIONS
AND MOVEMENTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d Congress, 2d Sess. 21, 24
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17
ratification of the Covenant by the United States by no means certain.
(3) There may be a feeling that American criminal law protects the
rights of the individual so well that its compatibility with, or even its superiority to, internationally established standards may have been taken for
granted.' 8 Whether such a feeling has been justified is quite another question which will be dealt with in the later parts of this article.

On the other hand, there is a substantial amount of evidence indicating
(1974) [hereinafter cited as A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP]. In 1976, the Senate ratified two
conventions guaranteeing the political rights of women. Weissbrodt, supra, at 236.
The most significant impact on achieving ratification of human rights conventions has
been the election of President Carter. Committed to making the advancement of human rights
a central part of U.S. foreign policy, the President called for ratification of four important
human rights covenants and conventions. Vance, Human Rights and ForetgnPolicy, 7 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 223, 226 (1977). Included in these was the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Address by Jimmy Carter, B'nai B'rith Convention (Sept. 8, 1976). In 1977, President
Carter further committed the U.S. to ratification of the United Nations Human Rights Covenants. See Address by President Carter, Inaugural Address, 123 CONG. REc. S 1131 (daily ed.
Jan. 20, 1977); Address by President Carter, United Nations, reprintedin N.Y. Times, March 18,
1977, at 10, col. 1.
In February 1978, President Carter transmitted to the Senate four treaties pertaining to
human rights "with a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification."
The four treaties included the two U.N. Covenants on Human Rights as well as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Four Treaties
Pertaining to Human Rights, Message from the President of the United States. U.S. Senate,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Gov't Printing Off., Wash., D.C. 1978 [hereinafter Message from the
President].
17. Recognizing the powerful sources of opposition to U.S. ratification of international
human rights agreements, contemporary writers indicated an almost unanimous belief that ratification of the United Nations Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was, at best, uncertain.
See V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 148, 245; Bitker, Human Rights and Untied States Foreign Policy:
Short Tem Prospects, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 601-06 (1974); Bitker, supra note 16, at 290-91;
Buergenthal, InternatzonalHuman Rights: US Policy and.Priorities, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 620-21
(1974); Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014; MacChesney, Should the Untied States Rati the Covenants?
A Question of MAerls, not of Constitutional Law, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 917 (1968).
Historically, strong lobbying forces opposed all contemporary human rights agreements
and attempted to force a general non-ratification policy. See V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 35.
Intermittently, constitutional amendments were proposed to block any future possibility of ratification. Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014. Writers, supporting either ratification or a substantive
analysis of the merits of each provision within the Covenants, agree that there is no question
concerning the constitutionality of international human rights agreements in general. Bitker,
supra note 16, at 279-84; Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014-17; MacChesney, supra, at 915.
In spite of the objection that adherence is an unconstitutional federal invasion of each
state's domestic jurisdiction, traditionally, Congress has exercised the power to enter into agreements containing human rights provisions. V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 131-32; Bitker, supra
note 16, at 279-84; Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014-17, 1020. Authorities challenged the usefulness of continued U.S. opposition to major agreements and its effect on American credibility in
the world community.
Disillusionment with the United Nations and uneasiness regarding potential political risks
of ratification were cited as the major reasons underlying this policy. Other authors noted the
advantages of American participation. V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 146-48; Bitker, supra, at
607-14; Buergenthal, supra note I, at 620-21. Comment, The InternationalHuman Rights Treaties.
Some Problems of Poly and Interpretation, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 886, 888 (1978).
The election of President Carter, whose administration is committed to obtaining ratification of the Covenants, has constituted a major shift in United States policy toward human
rights coventions. See note 16 supra.
18. Henkin, The United States and the Criis In Human Rights, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 653 (1974).
"The United States has seen international human rights as designed for others only. Our respect for human rights, we believe, already surpasses any foreseeable, acceptable international
standard; the need is to bring the blessings of our liberties to others." Id. at 663. See also V. VAN
DYKE, supra note 16, at 120.
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that the recent Polish penal law reform has been to some extent influenced
by the Covenant. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that several specific
changes have been made by the Polish draftsmen with an eye to the specific
provisions of the Covenant.' 9 Whether these changes have been sufficient to
bring the Polish penal system into conformity with the Covenant is still another question. Consequently the present article consists of two parts:
The first part discusses the influence exerted by the Covenant on the
Polish penal law reform. The last part assesses the compatibility of the
American and Polish penal systems with the two specific provisions of the
Covenant listed above. The two parts constitute the main body of the present article. But first, a brief discussion of certain general, however closely
related, issues is in order. The remainder of the present introduction is devoted to the discussion of these generalities.
Much has been written on various philosophical, ideological, and political concepts of, and approaches to, human rights. 20 A Marxist-Leninist view
of the subject matter as represented by socialist 2' countries has repeatedly
been juxtaposed and contrasted with the Western position. 22 Since the Polish legal system belongs to "the Marxian socialist group, ' ' 23 this paper will
focus briefly on this issue and ascertain its relevance for further discussion.
The Marxist concept of human rights is consistent with a broader
Marxist approach to the state and the law in general. The state and the
law-according to a standard Marxist position-are parts of a class superstructure, subject to historical changes, which are conditioned primarily by
changes in the mode of production (economic base or infra-structure). Consequently, Marxism rejects "the law of nature" approach to human rights as
19. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
20. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1972); DIE MENSCHENRECHTE: ENTWICKLUNG,

STAND, ZUKUNFT (Veiter and Kleineds. 1966); Bystricky, The Unversah'to of Human Ri'ghtr bn a
World of Conlmting Ideologies, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH NOBEL SYMP. (1968); Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights: An IdeoHistorical Surve, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SEVENTH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM (1968); Szabo, The TheoreticalFoundations of Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM (1968); Raphael, The Liberal Western Tradition of Human Rights, 18 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 2
(1966); Borucka-Arctowa, Wspolczesna koncepcja praw czlowieka, in KSIEGA PAMIATKOWA KU CZI
KONSTANTEGO GRZYBOWSKIEGO; Murphy, Ideological Interpretations of Human Rights, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 286 (1971); Burns, The Rights of Man Since the Reformation, in AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (F.A. Vallet ed. 1972).
21. By socialist countries we mean those countries which adhere to the social order built
upon the non-private ownership of the means of production. This operative definition is being
employed rather than others which are designed to prejudice the reader for or against a concept,
or are emotionally laden. See P. WILES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 2 (1964).
22. See M. HAUSER, supra note 10; Szabo, Fundamental Questions Conrterning the Theoq and
Hstov of Citiztns'Rights, in SOCIALIST CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1966); Bracht, Die Idee der
Menschenrechte in Staats-und Volkerrechtur-Standnis des Marxismus-Leninismus, DIE MENSCHENRECHTE, supra note 20; Hirszowicz, The Marxist Approach, 18 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 11 (1966);
Murphy, supra note 20; Przetacznik, The Soctalist Concept of Protection of Human Rights, 38 Soc.

RESEARCH 337 (1971).

23. See for a definition of "the Marxian

Socialist group," J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND

THEIR LAW; A SEARCH FOR THE COMMON CORE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN

SOCIALIST STATES (1969).
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"idealistic" and "ahistorical. ' '2 4 There is nothing "natural," "inborn," or
"inalienable" about human rights-Marxism claims-all rights are derived
from the will of the state. "Human rights" are not different: they exist only
because the state decided to confer them upon the individual. At this point
the Marxist approach intersects with a positivist approach. The fundamental difference, claimed by Marxists, 25 however, is that "the will of the state"
is not abstract and arbitrary, but is always historically determined by the
material conditions of social life.
Neither the historical relativism of the Marxist approach nor the class
interpretation of human rights, precludes Marxists from recognizing that
certain ideals and principles are of a universal nature in the contemporary
world.
It is indisputable-according to our views-that such notions
as law, justice, morality, democracy, freedom, etc. are historical
categories, whose content is determined by the conditions of life of
a people and by their social circumstances. As the conditions of life
change, so the content of notions and ideas may change.
The ruling ideas of an age are the ideas of its ruling class. However, this approach does not deny the existence of ideals, principles,
notions, which have at least to some extent-a universal character
and are a sort of common
denominator for everyone within a cer2 6
tain historical period.
Today ideological and philosophical disagreements between Marxists
and non-Marxists regarding theoretical foundations of human rights do not
preclude achievement of practical compromises as to desirable legal solutions. It has not been always so, however. It should be noted that the official
attitude of socialist countries toward human rights and their international
protection has undergone a substantial evolution. Legal and political theorists in these countries no longer claim that socialism per se automatically
27
eradicates conflicts between the individual and the state.
Indeed, there seems to be a growing recognition that such conflicts do
exist under socialism, and consequently, legal protection of the individual
against oppressive and arbitrary state actions still is, and will be in the fore28
seeable future, an issue of sizeable importance.
In short, the legal and political theory of socialist countries seems to
recognize the validity of a human rights issue under the socio-political condi24. Bracht, supra note 22, at 325; Szabo, supra note 20, at 35.
25. Szabo, supra note 20, at 40.
26. Bystricky, supra note 20, at 88.
27. Szabo, supra note 20, at 42; A. MICHALSKA, PADSTAWOWE PRAWA CZLOWIEKA W
PRAWIE WEWNETRZNYM A PAKTY PRAW CZLOWIEKA 38 (1976).
28. See Szabo, supra note 22. Blaming the need to elaborate legal safeguards on the negative experiences gained in the Stalinist period, Szabo indicates that legal protection of the individual against the socialist state is an issue:
This period served as proof that, although there is no conflict and, indeed, there cannot be a conflict between individual and community interests in a socialist society, yet
the occurrence of such incidental conflicts which originate in the shortcomings of the
activity of the government machinery, are not precluded, particularly when the organs
exercising state power superimpose their specific interests upon those of the community as a whole.

Id. at 19.
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29
tions of these countries.

Even more dramatically, socialist countries have changed their attitude
toward human rights in the international forum. Some thirty years ago the
Soviet delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, along with his Eastern European colleagues, abstained from voting for the Universal Declaration of
31
Human Rights. 30 Indeed the Declaration was denounced from the floor.
Today socialist countries not only give their approval to international legislation on human rights, 32 but praise and welcome it as a phenomenon of
33
great positive political value.
Indeed all of East European socialist countries, except Albania (notably
34
the USSR as first of the great powers), formally ratified the Covenants.
These evolutionary changes do not mean, of course, that all fundamental differences between the socialist and non-socialist approach to human
rights have disappeared. The most pronounced practical differences seem to
persist in the area of classical political rights and freedoms. Socialist countries give to such classical rights as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, an interpretation which, judging by Western standards,
renders them almost worthless.
Many of those living in socialist countries, most notably the intellectuals, share the prevailing Western view that Socialist law gives niggardly protection to political liberty. Several confrontations that have taken place in
recent years between socialist governments and various groups of the population have dramatized and made the differences over classical human rights
35
quite visible.
29. See Przetacznik, L Attidue des itats socrnlistes h l'gardde la protection biternationaledes drotits
de /'homme, 7 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 175, (1974). See also Szabo, supra note 22, at 1819.
30. 3 U.N. GAOR 852 (1948). At the end of the 183rd meeting held on 10 December
1948, the vote was taken on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among the eight
abstaining countries were: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia.
31. See 3 U.N. GAOR 853 (1948). Compare statements by Vyshinsky (USSR), id. at 854
with Katz-Suchy (Poland), id. at 903.
32. Socialist countries actively participated in the preparatory process. They endorsed and
welcomed the covenants being voted by the U.N. General Assembly as "an event of great historical and political importance." See Arkadiev and Igoriev, 5 Taktp o pravakh cheloveka, SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, (No. 5, Apr. 1967). 1. OSTROVSKII, OON I PRAVA CHELOVEKA
(1968); Resich, Pako Praw Czlowieka, NOWE PRAWO (No. 3, 1967); Bafia, Ratyfaca Paktow Praw
Cz/owieka w PRL, PANSTWO I PRAWO 3-5 (No. 4, 1977).
33. See, e.g., the discourse of the Czechoslovakian delegate at the General Assembly prior
to the vote on the Covenants, 21 U.N. GAOR 15, A/PV 1495 (1966). See also the discourse of
the Soviet delegate at the General Assembly after voting for the Covenants, 21 U.N. GAOR 13,
A/PV 1496 (1966).
34. Poland became the last of the group to ratify them in March 1977. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1279. None of the East European countries have signed or ratified the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 4 REV. Soc. LAW 85 (1978).
35. For a discussion of how the Soviets view the classical right of freedom of speech and
press, see V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 15. See A. SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE
WORLD (1975), and The Letter of 59 Intellectuals to the Speaker of the Diet of the Polish Peoples Republic, in 19 A CHRONICLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR 15 (Jan.-Mar. 1976) as illustrative of
differences of interpretation of classical human rights between intellectuals and socialist governments. See also Sharlet, Dissent and Regression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Changng Patterns Since Knishchev, 33 INTERNATIO NAT'L J. 763 (1978).
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The second area of most pronounced differences is the issue of economic
and social rights. Socialist countries insist on the priority of these rights over
36
classical civil and political rights.
The area which we propose to examine-the area of criminal law and
criminal procedure-is affected by the above mentioned differences only indirectly. The influence of the ideological and political differences is nevertheless not negligible and will be referred to when it is relevant.
In this last section of the Introduction we will discuss certain legal contexts in which interaction between international legislation on human rights
and municipal systems may occur.
There are two levels on which such an interaction may occur. First,
internationally established standards on human rights may function as a factor motivating national legislatures to act in a certain way or to refrain from
otherwise intended action. 3 7 Such motivation may occur in a variety of legal contexts. First of all an international treaty on human rights, such as the
Covenant, if duly ratified, confers upon a state a formal international obligation to shape its domestic legislation accordingly. 38 Appropriate changes in
municipal statutory law (or deliberately refraining from making changes)
would be just a discharge of formal treaty obligations. 39 Failure to discharge
a treaty obligation is an international delict and may be sanctioned.
A national legislature may also adjust municipal statutory law in anticipation of a future ratification of an international treaty. Changes in municipal law, in such a case, are motivated by international obligations likely to
arise in the future. This variation seems to be close to the case of the Polish
penal law codification: draftsmen of the new codes introduced several provisions and also repealed certain laws in strong anticipation that Poland would
ratify the Covenant in the near future.
Internationally established standards on human rights may, however,
40
Mulalso become binding upon states regardless of formal ratification.
tinational treaties on human rights, such as the Covenants, may generate
certain practices and consequently become sources of customary international law, binding universally, thus also binding upon those states which
36. Przetacznik, supra note 29, at 192-93. Ste note 33 supra, for the speeches of socialist
delegates to U.N.
37. By "national legislatures" we mean of course those who make actual decisions upon
appropriate courses of action or inaction.
38. Przetacznik, supra note 29, at 196. According to socialist doctrine, international protection of human rights consists of coordinating internal legislation with the obligations accepted
through the Convention. Each state has an obligation to enact legislation so as to assure the
rights agreed upon and to eliminate all areas of their legislation which are contrary to the
Covenant. See also Blishchenko, International Treaties and Their Apphcation on the Territoy of the

USSR, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 820 (1975).
39. This certainly would not have been the case with the Covenant, which has not yet been
ratified by the U.S. but has been ratified only recently by Poland. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.
D/9 p. 101. As of December 31, 1978, 55 countries had ratified including Poland on March 18,

1977. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/12.
40. See Clark & Nevas, The First 25 Years of the UniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rihts--andthe
Next, 48 CONN. B. J. 111 (1974). See also A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, supra note 16.
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did not formally accede to the treaties. 4 1 Certainly the Covenants, backed
by the authority of the unanimous vote of the General Assembly, the high
number of ratifying states, and the tradition of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and U.N. practices, may aspire to the role of a source of
customary international law. National legislatures may consequently be inclined to adjust their statutory law, even though their state fails to ratify the
Covenants.
The second level of interaction may be direct application of international law on human rights, especially appropriate treaty provisions, in a
municipal legal order. The question whether such an application is at all
feasible and what its further implications may be is basically a question of
constitutional law of the respective states. Consequently, the question cannot be resolved in the abstract, but should be considered separately with
respect to a given national legal system.
41. There is no clear answer as to whether the Covenant may become binding on the U.S.
as customary international law. Traditionally, writers have resisted the proposition that treaties
generate customary international law. Professor Baxter, in a well-known article on the subject,
has suggested that a treaty may be accepted as valid evidence of the state of customary international law if it purports to be declaratory of customary international law or "codifies" it. See
Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customag InternationalLaw, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275,
298 (1965-66). Although the covenant would probably not be regarded as codifying international law, Baxter does say that treaties directed toward the protection of human rights have a
wider claim for application than treaties concerned with the purely political and economic interests of states. Id. at 286.
Contrary to this widely held opinion is that one expressed by D'Amato that generalizable
provisions in multilateral treaties generate customary rules of law binding upon all states. A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). D'Amato argues that:
What has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature of international law is a
secondary, yet significant, effect of treaties. Not only do they carve out law for the
immediate parties, but they also have a profound impact upon general customary law
for nonparties. For a treaty arguably is a clear record of a binding international commitment that constitutes the "practice of states" and hence is as much a record of
customary behavior as any other state act or restraint. International tribunals have
already recognized this effect of treaties upon customary law, and historically treaties
have a decisive impact upon the content of international law.
Id. at 104.
Under this view the Covenant is a type of treaty which can give rise to a rule of customary
law since it is a multilateral treaty which contains generalizable rules. Id. at 105. See also
Humphrey, The Implementation ofInternationalHuman Rights Law, 24 N.Y. L. SCH. L.R. 31, 32
(1978). Humphrey argues that the provisions of a treaty may become norms of customary law
solely because the treaty is widely ratified.
If the modern trend towards viewing treaties as sources of customary law continues, the
Covenant would become binding on the U.S. even without ratification. Clark and Nevas indicated that such a trend was strong when they said that an important role might be played by
unratified treaties like the Human Rights Covenants and the Universal Declaration as authoritative interpretations of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter or in the development
of international customary law. Clark & Nevas, supra note 40, at 113.
Finally, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee of Foreign Affairs,
while investigating human rights, noted that "many statesmen and jurists now consider the
Universal Declaration to be an authoritative interpretation of the human rights clauses of the
Charter as well as part of customary international law and therefore legally binding upon
states." A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, supra note 16, at 19. With this in mind, one might
argue that even under a restricted view of international customary law such as Baxter's, the
Covenant would become customary law as it merely delineates or "codifies" that which has
already been accepted as international customary law.
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Poland

The legal status of international treaties in Polish municipal law is unclear. The 1952 Constitution left a gap here which legal writers have tried to
fill by advancing various theories, not necessarily compatible with each
other. A minority seem to suggest that every international treaty of a normative nature becomes, by virtue of ratification and official publication, "a
source" of municipal law equal to statutory law. The theory has a very weak
foundation. 42 As has been ably and convincingly argued by Professor
Skubiszewski, 43 there are compelling constitutional reasons to believe that
international treaties, in principle, are not included into the fabric of municipal statutory law. Nevertheless, the treaties are applicable and binding
44
upon agencies of internal legal order propro vigore, as rules suigeneris.
How are possible conflicts resolved between an international treaty rule
and a statutory rule? Skubiszewski suggests that the latter should prevail, 45
but his opinion has not been unanimously shared. 46 Whatever the correct
doctrinal solution, it is highly unlikely that law enforcement agencies would
give priority to a treaty provision over a statutory rule. Thus the Covenant,
even now after its formal ratification, may not repeal or supersede relevant
parts of the Polish statutory law. To this extent Jerzy Bafia is right. To
make the Polish penal system compatible with the Covenant, legislative
changes are necessary; one should not assume any automatic effect given to
the Covenant provision contrary to the statutory rules. 4 7 Hence, the answer
is rather clear in a case of conflict between the Covenant and statutory law.
The answer, however, is not at all obvious in the case of a legal vacuum.
Suppose a matter is not dealt with by Polish statutory law, but is fairly well
settled in the Covenant. Under the theory advanced by Skubiszewski, and
shared by a majority, the appropriate provision of the Covenant would be
"applicable and binding propro vigore" upon the agencies of internal legal
order. 4

Such a legal vacuum however, in the area of penal law, is rather

42. Gelberg, Umowyvjoko zrodloprawa PRL, SPRAWY MEIDZYNARODOE 45-46 (No. 4, 1965);
Gelberg, Umowy miedynarodowe w systemiepraownm PRL, NoWE PRAwo (No. 1, 1974). Similarly,
in the Soviet Union the prefered view is that treaties do not automatically become a source of
internal law. Miullerson, Natsional' no pravovaza implementatsiia mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov v SSSR,
VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA 64 (No. 6, 1978). Miullerson notes that some authors

believe that "[ain international agrement in which the Soviet Union participates should be
recognized as a source of internal law." But according to Miullerson, "an international agreement is not a source of national law either in the USSR or generally ....
"
43. See note 1 supra; Skubiszewski, The Validity of Treaties in Polsh Minzipal Law, Rapports
polonais pr6sent~s au VI Congress International de Droit Compar6 (1962). [hereinafter the Validi'ty of Treattes]. The most recent revision of the Constitution has not changed anything in this
regard. W. Sokolewicz, Konstytucia PRL Pozmianion 2 81 (1978).
44. Skubiszewski, supra note 1, at 9; The Validity of Treatys, supra note 43, at 121; Rozmaryn,
Skutecznosc umow miedzynarodowych PRL w stosunkach wewnetrznych, PANSTWO I PRAWO 956 (No. 3,
1962); Michalska, Paky Praow Czlowieka a katalog praow cywaterlskich w PRL, PANSTWO I PRAWO
59, (No. 3, 1973); In more recent Polish literature the issue is still considered as controversial. See
e.g., Resich, Pakty Praow Czlowzeka i ich ratyftactia, NOWE PRAWE 15, 21 (No. 5, 1977).
45. Skubiszewski, supra note 1, at 14.
46. See, e.g., Rozmaryn, supra note 44, at 963.
47. Bafia, Kodyflacya prawa karnego PRL a miedzynarodowy Pakt Prao Obywaterlskich i
Pohicznych, PANSTWO I PRAWO 43 (No. 7, 1969).
48. See note 44 supra. For an excellent general discussion of the domestic status of treaties
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unlikely.
B.

The Unzied States

In attempting to ascertain whether the provisions of the Covenant are
directly applicable law in the courts of a State Party, one must begin with
the manner in which treaty provisions become domestic law. In the United
States, a treaty which has been approved and duly ratified acquires the status of domestic law.49 Whether it then becomes directly applicable law in
the courts depends on whether it is deemed to be self-executing in nature. 50
A self-executing treaty has been defined as "applicable by, or binding
upon, national courts without legislative implementation."' 5' More precisely, the question of whether the provisions of the Covenant are self-executing depends upon, "whether they are precise enough and by their intention
destined for immediate and automatic application, or whether they call for
'52
further implementation in domestic law."
In the United States a treaty may be self-executing or non-self-executing, depending upon a determination by the courts. 53 Chief Justice Marshall, in one of the most quoted statements concerning self-executing treaties
said a treaty is:
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
Legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import
a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the Legislature must execute the contract, before
54
it can become a rule for the court.
This principle was further elaborated in Set Fulii v. Slate.55 In construing a treaty to determine whether it is self-executing, the courts look to the
intent of the signatory parties through the language of the instrument, and if
that is inconclusive, to the circumstances surrounding its execution. 5 6 The
intent of the parties must show that the provision, standing alone, would be
57
enforceable in the courts.
Therefore, for the provisions of the Covenant to be self-executing, they
in socialist legal systems see Ginsburgs, The Vahdiy of Treaties in the Municipal Law of the "Soctalist
States," 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 523, (1965). See notes 60-62 infa and accompanying text.

49. L.

SOHN &

T. BUERGENTHAL,

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1239

(1973) [hereinafter cited as L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL].
50. Id.
51. Schluter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the Unzed Nations Charter, 61
CAL. L. REV. 110, 111 (1973).
52. Council of Europe, Report cf the Committee of Experts on Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers, Problems Arising from the Co-Existence of the United Nations Covenants
on Human Rights and the European Covention on Human Rights, 13 (Strasbourg, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Comm. of Experts].
53. Cassidy, The United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the Domestic Law of the United

States, 48 B.U.L. REv. 106, 114 (1968).
54. Foster & Eram v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
55. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
56. Id. at 722, 242 P.2d at 620.
57. Id.
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must create specific obligations for the parties and meet certain standards of
58
precision.
The language of the provisions of the Covenant (ze., article 9 "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention;" article 14 "All persons
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals"), suggests immediate obligation. It has been stated that: "Standing alone, any provision of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights could readily be interpreted by a court to
be self-executing if the principles of interpretation suggested above were followed."'59 The specificity of the provisions, along with the history of the
Covenant indicating that the civil and political guarantees could be implemented immediately, make a strong case for self-execution.
On the other hand, in an attempt to answer the question whether the
Covenant is self-executing, the Committee of Experts on Human Rights' report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, focused on
article 2 of the Covenant. 60 The report indicated that article 2 has been
interpreted to mean that the obligations under the Covenant are not immediate and that it calls for progressive implementation. 6 ' However, they
noted that another interpretation of article 2 holds that the obligations are
62
to be implemented immediately upon ratification.
The Committee of Experts was unable to express a preference between
these two interpretations. 6 3 Legal writers differ on the subject, and it is anticipated that courts in different countries may reach conflicting conclusions
on whether the same treaty or provision is self-6xecuting. 64 Perhaps the best
conclusion is that, "[t]he most that can be concluded from the present state
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is that persuasive arguments
can be advanced to support opposite views: a court could readily conclude
that the provisions are self-executing, yet it could justify characterizing the
provision as non-self-executing." 65' It is thus impossible to make a definitive
statement as to whether the courts in the United States will find the Covenant to be self-executing.
58. Schluter, supra note 51, at 116, 142.
59. Cassidy, supra note 53, at 113.

60. Art. 2 of the Covenant reads in part:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional process and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Convenant.
61. Comm. of Experts, supra note 52, at 13.
62. Id. at 14.
63. See Velu, Le Droit h la liber el h la securitk de lapersonne (Elude comparativede l'arlzle,5de la
Convention europeene des droits de /'/omme et de l'artz le 9 du Pacte internationalrelalifaux droil civiles et
poitziues.) 49 REVUE DE Dkorr PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 167, 195 (1968).
64. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 49, at 1239.

65. Cassidy, supra note 53, at 114-15.
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INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RECENT
CHANGES IN THE POLISH CRIMINAL LAW

A.

Introduction

67
66
The entire body of Polish criminal law, i.e., substantive, procedural
68
and correctional, as well as so-called administrative-penal law, or law on
petty offenses in principle enforced by administrative agencies, 69 has been
recently codified. The timing of the compilation of the final drafts of the
principal Codes in 1967-68 and their enactment in 1969 is significant, for at
least two reasons, for the purposes of this paper.
First, the U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights had just
been adopted by the General Assembly.70 As mentioned, this fact 7' was
given substantial and laudatory publicity in Eastern European socialist
countries. 72 Moreover, Polish representatives in the U.N. Commission of
Human Rights and in other U.N. bodies dealing with international legislation on human rights were very active, and allegedly, played an important
role in the preparatory process. 73 This fact made the official Polish attitude,
and particularly, the question of Polish compliance with the principles and
standards of the Covenant, all the more internationally visible.
In addition, Polish responsiveness was probably enhanced because, at
that time, a Polish representative to the U.N. Commission of Human Rights,
Professor Zbigniew Resich, happened to be a trusted member of the then
influential party faction of so-called "Partisans". His loyalty to the faction
elevated him to the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and made
him an internationally visible figure. Mr. Resich's understandable desire to
save face in the international forum might have had some influence on the
drafting process. It counted if he advised the decision makers that certain
changes in Polish criminal legislation were necessary for raisons d' itat.

On the other hand, the general political situation in the country in the
late 1960s was not at all favorable to the promotion of human rights. Quite
the contrary, the faction of Partisans, which for years had been gaining influence and power, and which may be fairly characterized as anti-liberal, antiintellectual, and chauvinistic, was just about at the peak of its success. The
66. Criminal Code, the Law of April 19, 1969 [hereinafter cited as C.C.], (Journal of Laws
of the Polish People's Republic, 1969, No. 13, Item 94) [hereinafter cited as J.L.].
67. Code of Criminal Procedure, the Law of April 19, 1969 (J.L., 1969 No. 13, Item 96)
[hereinafter cited as CCP].
68. Correctional Penal Code, the Law of April 19, 1969 (J.L., 1969, No. 13, Item 98) [hereinafter cited as CPC]. See also the Penal Treasury Law of October 26, 1971 (J.L., 1971, No. 28,
Item 260) codifying substantive and procedural rules pertaining to tax offenses, offenses involving foreign currency and securities, as well as to custom duties violations.
69. The Code of Petty Offenses, the Law of May 20, 1971 (J.L., 1971, No. 12, Item 114);
The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses (J.L., 1971, No. 12, Item 116).
70. See note 3 supra.
71. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
I
73. Resich, Polska w obrone praw czlowieka, SPRAwy MEIDZYORODOWE 84 (No. 7-8, 1967);
Resich, Bilanspran ONZw dztiidzineipraw czlowieka, SPRAwy MEIDZYNARODOWE esp. at 37, 39
(No. 8, 1970); Resich, Pakty Praw Cz/owieka i ich ratyfikaga, NowE PRAWO 15 passim (No. 5,
1977); Michalska, Pakty Praw Czlowieka a kalaloc praw obywatelskih w PRL, PANSTWO i PRAWO 48
(No. 3, 1973); J. SYMONIDES, Miedzynarodowe ochronapraw czloweka 175 passin (1977).
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faction, its agents, and supporters controlled almost all the state and party
agencies which exercised coercive functions and thus were close to criminal
law making and administration (z'e., Administrative Department of the Central Committee, intelligence, security agencies, regular police, procuracy,
and Ministry of Justice).
Gomulka and his loyal followers in the top leadership (Kliszko,
Spychalski), with their strong anti-liberal, authoritarian inclinations, especially during the last years in power, were not far from the Partisans in their
conception of the relationships between the individual and the state.7 4 The
invasion of Czechoslovkia in August of 1968 certainly reinforced these antiliberal tendencies within the party and state apparatus.
Under the circumstances, one could hardly expect that the new codes
would bring any improvement in the legal situation of the defendant or the
means of legal protection of the individual in general. Indeed, even the preservation of the status quo ante might not have been the worst of all possible
solutions. As a matter of fact, the status quo was vigorously attacked as too
liberal by the promoters of the Polish "cultural revolution."
Given the circumstances prevailing during the process of codification, it
is remarkable that some changes which improved the legal position of the
defendant were nevertheless introduced into law. It is also remarkable that
some well advanced attempts to introduce changes with clearly anti-liberal
overtones conspicuously failed.
It may seem paradoxical that some "liberal" reforms of the Polish criminal law, which failed passage in much more "liberal" periods of Polish postwar history, were ultimately introduced in the most anti-liberal political atmosphere of the late 1960s. The apparent paradox can be explained, it is
submitted, by the fact that "most governments, including totalitarian governments, are sensitive to world public opinion."' 75 Some specific factors,
mentioned above, no doubt enhanced the sensitivity of Polish authorities to
possible adverse publicity. The public image of the Polish government
abroad in 1968 was at a very low point, 76 so it was felt that it should be
improved or at least not allowed to deteriorate further.
It is our hypothesis, therefore, that several changes introduced in Polish
criminal law in 1969 can be fairly attrributed to a deliberate attempt to
comply with the international legislation on human rights, and particularly
with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also our hypothesis
that at least one major addition to criminal law was given up because it
would violate international legislation on human rights. 77 The Polish gov74.

For a general discussion of the political situation in Poland in the late 1960's see: V.

JOHNSON, POLAND:

END OF AN ERA, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (1970); W. BIENKOWSKI,

MOTORY I HAMULCE SOCJALIZMU 32 (1969); Bauman, 0 frustracji i kuglarzach, KULTURA
(PARIS) (1968), Szulczynski, Sukcesy iporazki Mtzczyslawa Moczara, KULTURA (PARIS), (Jan-Feb.
1969). For an excellent discussion of the emergence and early Victories of the faction of Partisans see: W. JEDLICKI, KLUB KRZYWEGO KOLA (1963).
75. Humphrey, The Revolution in theInternationalLaw of Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS

205, 215 (1975).
76. See documents published in KULTURA (PARIS) 95-109 (June 1968).
77. At the time of codification Poland had not ratified the Covenant, but there was a
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ernment did not want to run that risk.
There are two kinds of evidence to support the above. The first is circumstantial, .e., a conspicuous concurrence of the merits, and, in some cases,
even the language of the changes introduced fry the new Polish codification
and the Covenant. Given the legislative history of the changes, 78 and the
political situation in the country, 79 the only plausible explanation is a deliberate attempt to comply with the Covenant. Second, there are the explicit
statements, official and semi-official, concerning the compatibihiO of the new
Polish codes with international legislation on human rights. Such statements have been made by leading members of the Polish legal establishment, politically responsible for the codification.8 0
They clearly indicate that the Polish authorities were well aware that
the old law had been incompatible with the Covenant and were eager to
demonstrate that the new codes assured compatibility. The statements,
however, would never openly admit that the changes in Polish law were generated by international law. After emphasizing over and over again full harmony between the new Polish criminal law and the Covenant, they never
said that appropriate changes were made in Polish law under the influence of
international law.
Indeed, to admit that Polish lawmakers felt compelled by international
law to afford better treatment to the Polish criminal defendant or the suspect, is to admit much. Such admissions, would be politically and ideologically unacceptable for several reasons. First, socialist legal systems,
according to a fundamental ideological postulate, are inherently superior to
all other legal systems in the world, including the system of international
law. Admissions that Polish criminal law was influenced by international
law would involve the implication, that, as Professor Ginsburgs wrote, "international law might be at a higher stage of development than the corresponding internal law of the 'Socialist' countries and official dogma could
'81
not readily countenance such a conclusion.
The claim of inherent superiority of socialist law has been made with
particular emphasis to human rights.8 2 Second, attributing progressive
changes in municipal law to international pressure would be inconceivable
strong expectation that it would be done. See Resich, Pakty Praw Czlowieka ic&h ratfyfaga, note
73 supra.
78. See notes 104-07 and 126-46 infra and accompanying text.
79. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
80. Bafia, Kodyfacja prawa karnego PRL a Miedzynarodowy Paki Praw Obywaterlskch itPotycsnych, PANSTWO l PRAWO (No. 7 1969); Resich, Humantzm prawa polskiego w swielle
miedzynarodowych aktow o ochronte praw cz/owieka, NowE PRAWO 886 (No. 7-8 1974).
See also Prsemcwienie Zenona Kliseki na plenarn)ym posiedzenu Sejmu dnma 18 kwietma 1969 r.,
PANSTWO I PRAWO 960 (No. 6 1969), where Kliszko, then a Politburo member, glorifies judicial
review of pretrial detention, but passes in silence its international law genesis.
Some establishment jurists have been carried by their zeal even further: they explicitly
denied any influence of international law upon CCP. See:'Siewierski etal., Zalozenia i koncepee
nowej kodyftacji poskiego prawa kamego, PROBLEMY NOWEGO PRAWA KARNEGO 149 (1973).
8 1. Ginsburgs, The Validi of Treaties in the Muncipal Law ofthe 'Soc ahi'States,supra note 48,
at 531.
82. See I. OSTROVSKII, OON i PRAVA CHELOVEKA (1968); see aLso for much more balanced
views, Michalska, supra note 32, at 51-53.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:4

in the atmosphere of chauvinist "socialist" rhetoric prevailing in the late
1960s in Poland. Third, such admissions might have also been politically
embarassing as admissions of weakness and an invitation to exert some international pressure in the future. Finally, they would implicitly challenge the
penal systems of those socialist countries which had not made analogous adjustments in their criminal law, such as the Soviet penal system.
Under the circumstances, it is no surprise that the authoritative writers,
while eager to demonstrate full harmony between the Covenants and the
new codes, become quite evasive and ambiguous about the genesis of the
changes. Jerzy Bafia in his article entitled "Codification of Criminal Law 8of3
the PPR and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights"
raises the question, "whether the solutions of the new codifications of criminal law are consistent with the Covenants."8' 4 Having answered the question
in the affirmative, Bafia passes by in silence the genesis of the changes in
Polish criminal law. He suggests that Polish criminal law meets the requirements of the Covenant or is even ahead of the Covenant because of its social85
ist and, hence, inherently humane nature.
Resich 8 6 goes one step further, however timidly; not only does he reiterate the full harmony of the new criminal law codification and the Covenant,
but he also points out that in the process of preparing the new codes the
Covenant was taken into consideration. 7 Such a statement, along with the
88
changes introduced by the codes and emphasized by Resich, come as close
as possible to an admission that the new codes have been influenced by the
Covenant. It should finally be noted that some writers were so eager to dissociate the changes in Polish criminal law from the Covenant that they explicitly denied any influence by the latter upon the former. Unfortunately,
89
while so doing they resorted to outright misstatements of well known facts.
B.

Major Cases of Attempted Compliance with International Legislation
on Human Rights

The changes introduced into Polish criminal law as a response to international legislation on human rights, particularly in response to the Covenant, may be roughly divided into two categories:
First, there are some changes of a verbal, declaratory nature, which
have not added anything to the contents of law. They have not created new
rights for the individuals nor imposed any new duties upon state agencies.
The category of verbal changes includes, for example, article 3, section 2
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which spells out presumption of innocence. True, the old 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure did not include an
83. See note 47 supra.
84. Id. at 47.

85. Id. at 41.
86. See Resich, supra note 80.
87. Id. at 886. Resich remarks: "In the process of codification, provisions of the draft
codes were compared with the Covenants on Human Rights."
88. Resich points to the new provisions on the death penalty, pretrial detention, and humane methods of carrying out criminal punishment.
89. See Siewierski, supra note 80.
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been
analogous provision; nevertheless, presumption of innocence has 9long
°
considered a fundamental principle of Polish criminal procedure.
To the same category belongs article 7, section 3, of the Correctional
Penal Code (CPC), which declares: "Penalties shall be carried out in a humanitarian manner, and with respect for the human dignity of the sentenced
person." This provision repeats almost verbatim article 10, section 1 of the
Covenant.
There is no need to elaborate further on the changes belonging to this
category. They are mentioned because they also prove some responsiveness
to international legislation; a responsiveness that is low in cost, but high in
visibility. 9 '
The second category includes changes of a more substantive nature.
We will now focus on them.
1.

The Repeal of Summary Procedure

Perhaps one of the most important changes in Polish criminal law introduced in response to the requirements of the Covenant was the repeal 92 of an
infamous summary procedure provided for by the edict of November 16,
93

1945.

The procedure was applicable to a broad range of cases, including common crimes such as intentional homicide or armed robbery, as well as whitecollar crimes and political offenses. 94 Some of the categories of cases falling
under the summary procedure were defined by the edict in extremely broad
and vague language.9 5 The procedure was always optional; it was made
applicable in a specific case by a motion of the prosecution subject to limited
review by the trial court.9 6 Discretionary decisions of the prosecutor to move
for a trial under the summary procedure were not guided by any ascertain97
able standards.
90. S. SLIWINSKI, PROCES KARNY ZASADY OGOLNE 115 (1948); L. SCHAFF, PROCESS
KARNY POLSKI LUDOWEJ 201 (1953); Cieslak, Problem gwarancjiikamo-proceso-wych na tlie nowe"
kodyfitkaji, PALESTRA (No. 3, 1969). Art. 3 § 2 CCP has been introduced as a response to art. 14
§ 2 of the Covenant.
At the level of legal ideology presumption of innocence has never been seriously questioned. Whether and how it has been actually observed and applied by law enforcement agencies is a different and much more difficult question. Some scholarly
discussions about presumption of innocence in Soviet criminal law seem to have overlooked this fundamental distinction. Compare Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in
The SovIet-Union, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1203 (1968) with Berman & Quigley, Comment on
the Presumption of Innocence Under Soviet Law, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1230 (1968).
91. It is not suggested here that the declaratory, verbal changes in criminal law are meaningless. They may play, in the long run, a positive role in the development of legal ideology and
may be used in critical evaluation of criminal legislation and its enforcement.
92. The Law of April 19, 1969, Provisions Introducing Code of Criminal Procedure (J.L.
1969, No. 13, Item 97), art. III, § 3.
93. Edict of November 16, 1945 on Summary Proceedings as amended (J.L. 1949, No. 33,
Item 244).
94. Id. at art. 1.
95. And so art. 1(1) "d" of the Edict, note 93 supra, made the procedure applicable to any
crime "if economic interests of People's Poland were threatened by substantial harm."
96. See Edict of November 16, 1945 on Summary Proceedings as amended (J.L. 1949, No.
33, Item 244), art. 1, § 3.
97. KALINOWSKI & SIEWIERSKI, Kodekspostepowanii kamego, KOMENTARZ 591 (1960).
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The defendant tried under this procedure was put at a tremendous disadvantage. Pretrial detention was mandatory 98 and the possibility of preparing a defense was drastically curtailed. 99 Judgements rendered by the
t
trial court were final and not subject to appeal. 00 In all cases tried under
the summary procedure the court, upon conviction, had to impose either the
death sentence, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a period not less
than three years; all of these regardless of the statutory sanction provided for
the specific crime charged.101
The summary procedure outlined above prevailed in the Polish legal
system throughout its post-war history. Even relatively recently, ie., in the
early and middle 1960s it had been quite vigorously applied, especially in
cases of grave economic crimes. 10 2 For example, in 1960 two big cases involving large-scale embezzlements in the leather industry were tried under
the summary procedure. The prosecution in both cases moved for the death
03
sentence for otherwise non-capital offenses. 1
In 1965, the case of Wawrzecki el al. was summarily tried in Warsaw.
The case involved a big racketeering ring in the meat industry. Wawrzecki
was sentenced to death and executed soon after, having been charged with a
non-capital crime. Thus, the summary procedure not only remained in the
books but was enforced, with all of its draconian severity and flagrant unfairness, until recently.
The reformers of the Polish criminal law apparently, until the last moment, did not contemplate abandonment of the summary procedure. The
official draft of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) published as late
as 1967,104 still included a separate chapter on summary procedure essen10 5
It is only the
tially similar to the summary procedure outlined above.
final official draft of the CCP, published at the end of 1968, which quietly
98. Set, Edict, supra note 93, at art. 8.
99. Id. at art. 11.
100. Id. at art. 13, § 4.
101. Id. at art. 2.
102. The number of cases tried under the summary procedure between 1959-68 were respectively: 1959-47; 1960-64; 1961-49; 1962-61; 1963-57; 1964-79; 1965-54; 1966-84; 1967-57; 196820. ROCZNIK STATYsTYCZNY, 1961-70. The above figures are not high, however they are not
negligible either. In 1966, for example, cases tried under the summary procedure represented
only slightly less than 5 % of the total load of criminal cases tried at the level of provincial courts
(84 out of 1842). One should also keep in mind that summarily tried cases involved quite often
big group trials with a substantial amount of publicity. Characteristically in 1968, when the
decision to abolish the summary procedure was made, the number of summarily tried cases
went down to 20, in 1969, before formal repeal went into effect (Jan. 1, 1970) summary trials
disappeared altogether. One would guess that behind their practical disappearance must have
stood some kind of internal procuracy instruction ordering subordinate procurators not to invoke the 1945 edict.
103. In the case of Galicki el al., tried in Warsaw in the summer of 1960, the trial court
imposed life sentences on two of the principal defendants whom the prosecution wanted to be
hanged. In the case of Dedo el al., tried in Kielce in the fall of the same year, two death
sentences were imposed, but later they were commutted to life imprisonment by way of executive clemency.
104. See KOEMISJA KODYFIKACYJNA PRZY MINISTRZE SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI, PROJEKT
KODEKSU POSTEPOWANIA KARNEGO (1967).

105. Id. at Chapter 44, Postepowanie Dorazne (arts. 480-89). See particularly art. 486, § 2
providing that decisions of the trial court are final and not subject to appellate review. At least
one essential difference between the 1967 draft and the old law should be noted. The draft did
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0 6
The whole chapter was simparted with the idea of summary procedure.'
ply omitted without a whisper about the change in the attached official com07
ment. 1
Polish legal writers agree that the summary procedure, ultimately re08
First of all
pealed in 1969, would be a flagrant violation of the Covenant.'
be in
would
sentence
and
the
the denial of the right to appeal the conviction
10 9
Covenant.
5
of
the
section
obvious violation of article 14,

Second, defendants tried under the summary procedure were, as we
pointed out before, seriously disadvantaged in comparison with a person indicted for offenses belonging to the same categories but tried according to
the standard procedure. Since the decisions to apply the summary procedure were made without any explicitly stated standard, the procedure would
be objectionable under article 14, section 1 of the Covenant. "0
Finally, imposition of a sentence more severe than the one authorized
by a specific criminal statute would be of very doubtful validity under article
15, section 1, second sentence of the Covenant. I Particularly, the legal
possibility and actual practice of inflicting the death penalty for non-capital
offenses would be a brutal violation of the principle nulla poena sine lege embodied in article 15 of the Covenant.
2.

Capital Punishment

Capital punishment is the second area in which the Covenant has had a
visible impact on the new criminal legislation. The Covenant emphatically
declares in article 6, section 2 that "[i]n countries which have not abolished
the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with law in force at the time of the commission of
"
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant ....
The obvious intention of the Covenant is to encourage total abolition of
the death penalty, and in those countries which are not ready for total abolition, to limit its application to exceptionally grievous offenses.'12
The 1969 Criminal Code (CC) consistently with the legislation of all
11
other socialist countries 3 has retained the death penalty.' 14
not authorize sentences more severe than the statutory maximum provided for by substantive
criminal statutes.
See generally Projekt kodeksu postepowania karnego oraz przepisow vprowadzajacych
kodeks postepowania karnego, (1968).
106. Id.
107. Seegenerally Uzasadnenieprojekukodekrupostepowana karnego, supra note 105, at 152-189.
108. See S. WALTOS, POSTEPOWANIA SZCZEGOLNE W PROCESIE KARNYM 34 (1973); Cieslak,
supra note 90, at 38.

109. Art. 14,.§ 5 reads: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction
and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law."
110. Art. 14, § 1, first sentence declares: "All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals."
111. The relevant part of art. 15, § 1 reads: "Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offense was committed."
112. Landarer, Capital Punihment as Human Rights Issue Before the United Nations, 4 Revue de
Droits de l'Homme 511, 526-28 (1971).
113. 1. ANDREJEW, ZARYS PRAWA KARNEGO PANSTW SOCJALSTYCZNYCH 150 (1975).
114. See C.C., supra note 66, at art. 30, § 2.
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At the same time the CC, echoing article 6, section 2 of the Covenant, 115 adopted a provision which characterizes the death penalty as a
measure of exceptional character provided for the most grave offenses. 1 16
The provision is no more than a general policy statement which may be
carried out either at the legislative and law enforcement levels or turned
easily into a facade devoid of any practical meaning. As the experience of
recent years has taught, there have been penal systems which have paid lip
service to the same policy while at the same time generously administering
the death penalty. 1 7 After all, how often the exceptions may occur and
what offenses are "the most grave" are political judgments. Hence, the limiting effect of the provision per se is almost nil. A much more interesting
question is how the legislative promise has been implemented at the lawmaking and law-enforcement levels.
Thus far there has been at least one attempt by the Supreme Court to
pour some operational meaning into article 30, section 2 of the CC through
construing "the exceptional character" of the death penalty as a guideline
for the sentencing courts. In a decision of March 16, 1971,118 the Court
indicated that the death sentence may be imposed only for acts which distinguished themselves from other capital crimes by certain exceptional features.
The death sentence would be justified particularly when the demoralization
of the defendant is so profound that the chances for his rehabilitation are
very poor or nonexistent. The defendant's personality must be such that
even long term imprisonment is unlikely to result in rehabilitation.
Therefore, article 30, section 2 of the CC, echoing the Covenant, triggered a ruling by the Supreme Court, which may have some impact on sentencing practices by the lower courts. As of now, however, it is impossible to
ascertain any impact. The number of death sentences imposed by Polish
courts during the last twenty years has not been very high, but nothing in
this respect changed after the new CC entered into force. 119
On the legislative level the new Polish law reduced the number of capi115. Bafia, supra note 47, at 48, explicity indicates that art. 30 § 2 of the C.C. is a direct
response to art. 6, § 2 of the Covenant.
116. See C.C., supra note 66, at art. 30, § 2. The present as well as all the subsequent quotations from the 1969 C.C. are from: Kenney & Sadowski, The Penal Code of the Polish People's
Republic. (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 19 (1973)).
117.

See genrally FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LEGISLATION OF THE USSR

AND THE UNION REPUBLICS, Law of December 25, 1958, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta
SSSR, 1959, No. 1, Item 6, art. 22.
At the same time Soviet criminal legislation is rather generous with the death penalty; see,
for example, RSFSR criminal code providing the penalty for about 35 crimes. The number of
death sentences actually imposed by the Soviet courts-and the number of executions, have not
been officially reported. Sakharov makes an estimate of the number of executions as between
700-1000 per year. A. SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 43 (1975). The number,
even if exaggerated, is outrageously high.
118. Decision No. I KR 274/70, by an enlarged panel of 7 justices, published in: RUCH
PRAWNICZY EKONOMICZNYI SOCIJOLOGICZNY 345 (No. 1, 1972).
119. The number of death sentences imposed by final judgments during the ten years preceding the 1969 C.C. has been reported as follows: 1959-8; 1960-11; 1961-14; 1962-6; 1963-8;
1964-6; 1965-3; 1966-9; 1967-4; 1968-5; 1969-6. ROCZNIK STATYSTYCZNY, 1961-70.
Figures for the three years after the Criminal Code entered into force, if anything, show
some increase of the death sentences: 1970-10; 1971-9; 1972-15. Ministerstwo Sprawiedliewosci
Statystyka Sadowa 1972. Zesc III. PROWOMOCNE SKAZANIA OSOB DOROSLYCH 88 (1973).
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20
tal offenses in three ways: 1

(a) Article 31 of the CC makes the death penalty inapplicable, "to a
person who at the time of the act has not attained the age of 18 years" and
"to a pregnant woman." This provision has been given a liberal construction. The death penalty has been held inapplicable to a pregnant woman
whether pregnancy existed at the time of the act, at the time of sentencing,
12
or at the time of execution. '
If a person who belongs to a class specified in article 31 has been erroneously sentenced to death, or if pregnancy has occurred after the death sentence has been pronounced, the trial court shall re-sentence the defendant to
22
25 years of imprisonment. 1
(b) The repeal of the summary procedure, which carried a possibility
of the death sentence for a broad range of crimes otherwise non-capital, nar1 23
rowed the scope of capital punishment.
(c) Finally, the number of capital felonies was somewhat reduced either by replacing the death penalty by long term imprisonment 124 or by
25
more narrow statutory definitions of some capital offenses.'
While the changes mentioned under (c) are no doubt in line with the
general policy of limiting the death penalty as stated in article 6, section 2 of
the Covenant, there is no evidence that this substantive political decision was
in any way influenced by international law.
The genesis of the changes mentioned under (a) and (b), however, can
be easily traced to the Covenant. Article 31 of the CC is clearly related' 26 to
Article 6, section 5 of the Covenant. In regard to persons who at the time of
the Act had not attained 18 years of age, the Code adopts almost verbatim
the rule included in the Covenant. ' 27 With respect to pregnant women, the
Code certainly adopted higher standards than the Covenant, not only barring execution at the time of pregnancy but generally exempting pregnant
women from the death penalty. ' 28 The relationship between the Covenant
and the repeal of the summary procedure has already been discussed.
120. Andrejew, Polskieprawo karne w zarysie 245 (3d ed. 1973).
121. See generally PROJEKT KODEKSU KARNEGO 108 (1968); I. ANDREJEW, W. SWIDA, W.
WOLTER, KODEKS KARNY Z KOMENTARZEM

179 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDREJEW &

SWIDA]; Bafia, Mioduski, & Siewierski, Kodeks karny, KOMENTARZ 121 (1971).
122. &e CPC, supra note 68, at art. 111. S&e also ANDREJEW & SWIDA, supra note 121, at
179, passim; Pawela, Kodeks karny wykonawczy, KOMENTARZ 323 (1972).
123. Andrejew, supra note 120, at 245; Bafia, supra note 47, at 48.
124. Andrejew lists seven such provisions. Andrejew, supra note 120, at 245. There are also
some additions to the list of capital crimes, notably art. 134, § 2 of the Criminal Code.
125. Examples are political terrorism, sabotage and espionage defined formerly in arts. 1, 3,
and 7 of the so called Small criminal code (edict of June 13, 1946, on Crimes Particularly
Dangerous during the Period of State Reconstruction, J.L. 1946, No. 30, Item 192), and now
defined in arts. 124, 126, and 127 of the Criminal Code. See also Andrejew, supra note 120, at
245.
126. Bafia, supra note 47, at 49.
127. Art. 6, § 5 of the Covenant reads: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women."

128. Bafia, supra note 47, at 49.
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Pretrial Detention

A major novelty introduced by the new 1969 CCP is judicial review of
pretrial detention of the suspect during preliminary investigation. The issue
of pretrial detention has been of major importance in all Continental European legal systems. It involves deprivation of freedom of an individual who
has not yet been found guilty. Moreover, the very process of adjudication is
likely to be heavily influenced by pretrial detention. In Poland, as well as in
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, the issue of pretrial
detention has been particularly acute and sensitive for the reasons too well
known to require any further discussion here.
During some twenty years preceding the 1969 codification the law on
pretrial detention in Poland included the following fundamental rules:
(1) The police had power to arrest and detain a person suspected of a crime
for up to forty-eight hours. After forty-eight hours, the detained person had
to be released unless his or her further detention was approved by the prosecutor. 129 (2) The power to invoke more prolonged pretrial detention of a
suspect, before a formal indictment was filed with a court, was vested exclusively in the procurator's office.' 30 Procurators of various ranks, including
the Procurator General, had the power to keep a suspect in incommunicado
detention for up to nine months. 13 1 Detention beyond a nine month period
required approval by the Supreme Court. 3 2 (3) The grounds for pretrial
detention were broadly defined and liberally applied in practice.133 A striking feature of the law prevailing before January 1, 1970, was the virtually
monopolistic power of the prosecution (procuracy) over the personal liberty
of a suspect during preliminary investigation.1 34 The law has long been subject to strong criticism by legal scholars. A dominant academic opinion favored some kind of judicial review of pretrial detention.1 35 A leading Polish
authority on criminal law, the late Professor Stanislaw Sliwinski, even suggested that the power of pretrial detention be completely taken away from
36
the procuracy and vested exclusively in the court.'
129. CODE OF CRIM. PRO. Law of March 19, 1928, as amended J.L. 1950, No. 40, Item 364
[hereinafter cited as 1928 CCP]. The law on this matter was left virtually unchanged in 1969.
See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 205-08.
130. The Polish procuracy has been patterned since 1950 after the Soviet model. All the
admixtures of ombudsmanship notwithstanding, the hard fact remains that the procurator is
first of all responsible for prosecution of crimes. His responsibilities as investigator and prosecutor by far overshadow all the remaining activities and reponsibilities. On the Soviet concept of
procuracy, see H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 238-47 (2d ed. 1963).
131. See 1928 CCP, supra note 129, at art. 158, §§ 1-3.
132. Id. at art. 158, § 4.
133. Id. at art. 152, § 1.
134. Kaftal, Kontrola sadu had tymczasowym aresztowanezm w swietle orzecznmctwa SN, 1972
PANSTWO I PRAWE (No. 12), at 89-90; A. MURZYNOWSKI, ARESZT TYMCZASOWY 125-27 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as A. MURZYNOWSKI].
135. Haber, Instyluijzazalena wproceste karnyn, 1957 NoWE PRAWO (No. 4), at 23, passn;
Litynski, Murzynowski, Niektoreprawva osobisie obyjwaie/i w swielle art. 74 Konslyiucji PRL oraz waznte
szych ustaw szczegolowych, 1957 NOWE PRAWO (No. 10), at 57; Kaftal & Namiotkiewicz,
Sprawozdanze z sesji naukowej Unwersetu Warszaw skiego, PANSTWO I PRAWO 594, passim (No. 3
(1955)).
136. Sliwinski, Zasaolnzczc problemy Kuoly Fikacjiprawa Karnego Rrocesowego, NOWE PRAWO 6
(No. 3, 1957).

1980]

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW

All the criticism notwithstanding, the harsh rule giving the procuracy
unfettered power to detain a suspect persisted through out the twenty-year
period of 1950-70. Suprisingly, the rule survived even the relatively "liberal"
137
and
time of 1956-57, when pressure for change was particularly strong
memories of presecutorial and police abuses very fresh and openly admitted.
The advocates of the rule later developed a theory that since the procuracy is
situated outside the system of state administration, its officers are as in38
The fact that procurators
dependent and impartial as judicial officers.1
are bound to follow orders from their superiors, and that the procuracy is
above all institutionally interested in the39 prosecution of crimes, was overlooked by the supporters of this theory.'
Nothing, until the very end of the drafting process of the 1969 CCP,
1 40
left
indicated that change was forthcoming. The 1967 draft of the CCP
4
the status quo ante on pretrial detention virtually untouched.i i Again, the
procuracy was given exclusive power to detain a suspect during preliminary
142
A breakthrough occurred in 1968;
investigation for up to nine months.
43
the draft of the CCPt included new rules giving the judiciary some, however modest, amount of control over pretrial investigative detention. 144
There is no doubt that the change was generated entirely by the145desire to
avoid a flagrant violation of article 9, section 4 of the Covenant.
Assertions to the contrary 146 must fail, not only in the face of the quite
unambiguous legislative history, but in view of official admission as well. A
highly authoritative official source, namely "Supporting Reasons of the
Draft Code of Criminal Procedure," ' 14 7 which constitutes an integral part of
the final draft, offers the following comment on the change:
Art. 213, introduces an important change in the present law by ruling that
the complaint from the decision of the procurator on preliminary
detention shall be considered by the court with jurisdiction over
the case . . . . Art. 222 goes in the same direction, it gives the
provincial courts jurisdiction to consider complaints against decisions by the provincial procurators on the extension of preliminary
detention . . . . Thus, the principle ofjudicialreview ofprocuratorialdeciCovenant
sions to apply prehminary detention, included in the International
1
on Civil and PoliticalRights, has been implemented. 48
137. See notes 135-36 supra.
138. The theory has been lingering even after the 1969 reform. See Siewierski, supra note 80,
at 150.
139. See A. MURZvNOWSKI, supra note 134, at 126; Haber, supra note 135, at 23. Fundamental institutional differences between procurators and judicial officers have been recently
fully acknowledged in Soviet as well as in Polish literature. See M. STROGOVICH, PROBLEMY
SUDEBNOI ETIKI (1974); Smolenski, Ustawa o prokuraturze PRL, KOMENTrARZ 28 (1971).
140. See note 104 supra.
141. Id. at arts. 225-41.
142. Id. at arts. 237, 419.
143. See note 105 supra.
144. Id. at arts. 213, 222.
145. Art. 9, § 4 reads: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest and detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful."
146. Siewierski, supra note 80, at 149.
147.

See note 107 supra.

148.

Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
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Likewise, Bafia, in more evasive language, admits 149 that the change in the
law on preliminary detention was necessary to make it compatible with article 9, section 4 of the Covenant. 150 The above statements amount to an
admission that the law on preliminary detention preceding the reform did
not satisfy internationally established standards and that only the reform
made them compatible.'51 Commentators are even more explicit in this re52
gard.1
The relevant portions of the new law may be briefly summarized as
follows: (1) The initial decision on preliminary detention during investigation is made by the regional procurator; the period of detention may not
exceed three months.' 53 The decision is subject to review by the court with
jurisdiction over the case. 15 4 (2) If preliminary investigation, due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case, cannot be completed within the three
month period, the period of preliminary detention may be extended if necessary:
up to 6 months by a provincial procurator, whose decision in this
matter is subject to review by a provincial court upon complaint of
the suspect; 155 for a period exceeding 6 months by a provincial
court upon a motion by a provincial procurator; a decision of a
provincial court in this matter is reviewable by the Supreme Court
156
upon complaint by the suspect.
(3) The reviewing court makes its decisions, in ex parte proceedings, in
which only a procurator may participate; a hearing is not held; the factual
basis for the decision is evidence gathered by the investigation and submitted
15 7
to the court in a dossier.
The laconic and rather poorly drafted new rules on preliminary detention left many issues unresolved and hence open to various interpretations.
This is especially true of the provisions on judicial review of preliminary
detention, which became controversial almost immediately after the CCP
was passed into the law.' 58 Conservative writers have tried to take advantage of statutory ambiguity to restrict judicial intervention as much as possible.'- 9 On the other hand, a dominant scholarly opinion favored a liberal
construction of the ambiguous provisions on judicial review. At least during
the first few years after the CCP was adopted, the Polish Supreme Court was
allied with the latter group on most controversial issues.
149. Bafia, supra note 47, at 50.
150. See note 145 supra.
151. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
152. Cieslak, supra note 90, at 36; Kaftal supra note 134, at 90.
153. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 222, § 1. A regional procurator is a procurator at a basic
level.
154. Id. at art. 212, § 2.
155. A provincial procurator is a procurator at an intermediate level.
156. See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 222, §§ 2, 3.
157. Id. at arts. 88, 299, §§ 1, 2. See also Bafia, Bednarzak, Fleming, Kalinowski, Kempisty
& Siewierski, Kodeks postepowania karnego. KOMENTARZ 268 (1971). For well founded criticism of the present law see Kaftal, supra note 134. Lyczywek, Instytacja aresztu twrczasowego w
projekcie kodeksu posepowania karnego, 1969 Palestra, No. 1; 24.
158. Kaftal, supra note 134.
159. See Bafia, supra note 157.
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Just a few selected examples will illustrate the point. The question
arose relatively early whether a procurator's decisions to extend the originally assigned period of detention are reviewable by the court. The issue has
not been entirely clear under the language of article 212, section 2 of the
CCP, which provides that decisions "to apply" preliminary detention are
reviewable but says nothing about decisions "to extend" the period of detention.
"Conservatives" relied on the distinction, arguing further that article
212, section 2, as an exceptional rule, should be strictly construed and hence
judicial review should be ruled out.' 6° But "extension" of the originally assigned period of detention, advocates of judicial review argued in response,' 6 1 actually means further "application" of preliminary detention to
a suspect already detained. Hence, the distinction relied upon by "conservatives" is purely verbal and irrevelant. The Supreme Court took the same
position and ruled accordingly in a joint resolution of the Criminal and Mili62
tary Chambers. 1
The second major subject of controversy has been the options open to
the reviewing court. Is the only choice between setting a suspect free or sus63
taining the detention?'
Perhaps the reviewing court may elect a third avenue 164 by modifying a
procurator's decisions through reducing the assigned period of detention or
by substituting for detention other less coercive measures of restraint. 165
The Supreme Court, after an initial period of hesitation, ultimately
adopted the latter view which had been supported by the majority of legal
writers. 166 It has been pointed out that such a statutory construction is, on
balance, favorable to a suspect because it gives the reviewing court the possi67
bility of a compromise decision, in cases where outright release is unlikely. 1
The CCP explicitly says in article 212, section 3 that a decision of the
reviewing court may not be further appealed by a suspect. Can it, however,
be appealed by the prosecution? The Supreme Court answered in the af69
firmative. 16 The issue again has been controversial among legal writers. 1
160. Id. at 268, 541.
161. Kaftal, supra note 134, at 100; Mazur, tektore kwestte zwiazane z zaskarzaniem do sad
postanowien prokuratora o zastosowantu tvmczasowego aresztowama, 1971 NoWE PRAWO No. 5; 38
Ligarzewska, Uprawmniena prokuratora w przedmiocte stosowania tymczasowego aresztowama po deyzJi
sadu, NOWE PRAWO 1492 (No. 11, 1974).
162. Resolution of Criminal and Military Chambers of the Supreme Court of June 18, 1971
(VI KZP28/1970), 1971 USNLK. H No. 10, Item 141.
163. Such a solution was suggested in Bafia, supra note 157, at 256.

164. See Kaftal, supra note 134, at 100.
165. Those include such measures as financial, non-financial surety, or police supervision.
CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 226, 231, 235.
166. See the Supreme Court resolution of June 18, 1971, supra note 162. See also Kaftal,
supra note 134, at 101.
167. Kaftal, supra note 134, at 102.
168. Compare Sup. Ct. Res. June 26, 1970 (enlarged panel of seven justices VI KZP 17/70)
with OSNIKIW, No. 9, Item 100 (1970).
169. Accord, Bafia, supra note 157, at 256. For a well founded criticism of the resolution, see
D. Cieslak, Przeglad orzeczmniwa SAdu Najwyzszego, WoJsKowY PRZEGLAD PRAWNICZY (No. 2
1971) citedin Kaftal, supra note 134.
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The above controversies over judicial review of preliminary detention,
and sharp divisions between advocates and adversaries of the new legal institution, show how vital the whole issue has become. Liberally minded Polish
writers suggest that, however weak and imperfect the present legal framework for judicial review of pretrial detention, it is much better than the former law. It represents a potential for better protection of the individual
170
against arbitrary prosecutorial decisions.
How this potential has been used by the judiciary is another question.
The scarce empirical data available would rather suggest that the judiciary
has been either extremely timid to use its newly acquired power or too
prosecutorially minded, or both. The fractional figures from two provinces
(Wroclaw and Kielce) strongly suggest that judges tended to rubber-stamp
prosecutorial decisions on preliminary detention. The record of the
171
Supreme Court practice has not been better.
4.

Rise and Fall of the Anti-Parasite Law

The last case which will demonstrate the impact that international legislation on human rights has had upon recent Polish law reforms is different
from the preceding three. Here, we will deal with a law that was never
passed and will discuss a reform carefully planned and well advanced, but
never actually implemented. What follows is the brief history of the rise and
fall of the Polish anti-parasite legislation.
Anti-parasite legislation seems to be a distinctive feature of socialist legal systems. 17 2 It is relatively well known in the West because of the much
publicized Soviet experience. 173 Poland has been, and still is, a conspicuous
exception. She has never had anti-parasite legislation. In the political atmosphere prevailing in Poland in the late 1960's,174 it was not at all surprising that proposals to introduce anti-parasite law became quite audible.
Indeed, anti-parasite legislation seemed to be an ideal vehicle to control
and intimidate dissidents and other non-conformists. It would give the authorities a very broad range of control over undesirables of various kinds,
especially those who in the process of the purges of 1968-69 were fired from
their jobs or expelled from universities. Anti-parasite rhetoric was also useful
as a blame-fixing mechanism in a rather gloomy economic situation. The
170. Cieslak, supra note 90, at 36; Kaftal, supra note 134, at 104.
171. MATERIALY KONFERENCJII POSWIECONEJ PROBLEMATYCE PRAKTYKI WYMIARU
SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI NA TLE ZASAD NOWEJ KODYFIKACJII PRAWNE 173 passim 193 passim (1972),
cited in Kaftal, supra note 134.
172. I. ANDREJEW, supra note 113, at 126-28.
173. H. Berman and J. Spindler, Soviet CriminalLaw and Procedure 77-81 (2d ed., 1972); Lipson, The Future Belongs to. . . Parasites, 12 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, No. 3 (1963); Burford,
Getting the Bugs out ofSocialist Legality The Case ofJoseph Brodsky anda Decade of Soviet Anti-Parasite
Legl lation, 22 AM. J.C.L. 465 (1974). Soviet anti-parasite law has been recently amended
again. Compare two edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of August 7,
1975 (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSRSR, 1975, No. 33, Items 698, 699). The recent
changes have been most probably a result of international pressure, especially exerted by the
International Labor Organization. See ForcedLabor in the USSR, 1975 A Chronicle of Human
Rights in the USSR, No. 15, 15 passin.
174. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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1970 price increases and their further well known consequence showed that
the country was on the verge of economic disaster.
The first idea was to introduce an anti-parasite provision into the newly
drafted criminal code. The 1968 draft included article 290, which read as
follows:
§ 1 Whoever leads a parasitic way of life, by deriving a permanent source of income from corrupt activity shall be subject to the
penalty of limitation of liberty.
§ 2 In cases of persistence, the perpetrator shall be subject to the
175
penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years.
In the course of discussion of the draft outside the Sejm, especially in
the legal periodicals, the anti-parasite provision was passed over in silence. 176 However, at one of the two conferences devoted to key problems of
the draft, organized by the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy
of Sciences (ILS) on November 22-23, 1968, the anti-parasite provision came
under very heavy fire. 17 7 Virtually no one at the conference, except Jerzy
Bafia,' 783 defended the anti-parasite statute.' 79 The principal arguments
raised against it were its vagueness, its anticipated arbitrariness of enforcement, and its involvement of forced labor. In this context, it was claimed
that the proposed provision violated the internationally approved principle
of legality in criminal law' 8 0 as well as international conventions banning
forced labor. 181
A memorandum to this effect was submitted by the Institute of Legal
Sciences to the Administration of Justice Committee of the Sejm. The Committee decided to delete the anti-parasite provision from the final version of
the draft, and a plenary session of the Sejm, which ultimately passed the
draft into law on April 19, 1969, did not have the provision before it.
The extent to which the
ILS memorandum influenced
is virtually impossible to say.
that social parasitism should
rather than penal in nature.

opinion of the legal scholars presented in the
the decision to delete the anti-parasite statute
The official justification for the deletion was
be dealt with by a separate statute, remedial

The idea of an anti-parasite law was thus temporarily tabled. It reemerged early in 1971, right after the fall of Gomulka and his team. Why
the idea of a very coercive, anti-liberal law re-emerged in the much im175. Komisja Kodyfikacyjna przy Ministrze Sprawiedliwosci, Projekt kodeksu karnego
(1968), art. 290.
176. See generally writings on the 1968 Draft Criminal Code listed in: W. Swida, Prawo kame.
Czesc ogolna, 77 (1971).
177. Dwte konferenqe w Instytucie Nauk Prawnych PAN poswzecone projektowi kodeksu kamego,
PAWSTWO v. PRAWO, 625 (No. 3, 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Dwie konferencqe].
178. Then a political supervisor of criminal law codification, a high official of the Ministry
of Justice, and Professor of Law, now Minister of Justice.
179. Dwiekonferencje, supra note 177, at 625.
180. The Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 15, § 1.
181. International Labor Organization Conventions: No. 29 of June 28, 1930 and No. 105
of June 25, 1957, both ratified by Poland on June 23, 1958 (Ratification acts published in J.L.
1959 No. 20, Item 122 and No. 39, Item 240).
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proved political atmosphere of early 1971, is difficult to understand. Some
hypotheses should prove useful.
The new leadership, which took over in December 1970, was definitely
interested in building up a new alliance with the masses who were alienated
by Gomulka. Naturally, the main target was the numerous, self-confident,
politically and economically crucial (but dissatisfied and mutinized) industrial proletariat. A sense of social injustice and economic frustration was
very strong among the industrial workers. Hatred for those who contribute
little or nothing at all but get much, those who live "on the blood and sweat"
of the toiling masses, filled the air. There is no doubt that the new leadership was well aware of this bitterness and decided to do something about it.
The repeal in February 1971 of the price increases announced in December 1970 was a major step in this direction, however reluctantly made.
Official propaganda was full of the rhetoric of "worker's democracy." The
anti-parasite campaign, inaugurated by the Politbureau in February 1971 as
a part of the comprehensive "improvement program," fit the picture rather
well. Readers of newspapers were simply told that the party had decided to
fight "parasitic elements,"' ze., those who do not work but nevertheless live
well.
The targets of the campaign were defined vaguely, in a sloganeering
style, so that everybody could subsume under this concept a type of personality he or she particularly disliked. A pilot sociological survey among workers in the steel industry combine at Nowa Hutta showed, for example, that
party apparatus officers were identified first as parasites.
As a propaganda tool, an anti-parasite campaign seemed to achieve its
goals because it conveyed to the public an idea that the party was "doing
something" to control "socially harmful elements." On the other hand, the
extreme vagueness of the concept of "a parasite" assured the authorities that
the actual enforcement would be entirely discretionary, hence in line with
current notions of expediency. The Ministry of Justice soon drafted, as ordered, the statute "On the Prevention and Struggle Against Social Parasitism."
The draftsmen, following the Soviet prototype of anti-parasite law, envisioned the statute as "administrative" or "remedial" in nature rather than
penal. In this way they tried to respond to the charges of vagueness and
narrow-minded punitiveness voiced earlier against article 290 of the 1968
Draft CC. Instead of criminal punishment, the 1971 draft provided for
"measures of social pressure" to be applied to social parasites. Thus, the
party once again tried the familiar technique of changing labels to conceal
the coercive nature of the law.
Article 1 of the draft defined social parasitism as follows:
The provisions of the present law shall be applied to persons, who
attained 18 years of age and do not continue their studies, and,
while able-bodied, lead a parasitic way of life in that they persistently avoid socially useful work, and derive their means of support
from sources contrary to the principles of communal life, and thus
represent a threat to the legal order.
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Sanctions provided against such social parasites were three-fold, with
increasing degrees of severity: (1) a warning by a local agency of internal
affairs; (2) "educational supervision" coupled with a compulsory labor assignment (to be imposed if the warning was ineffective); and (3) confinement
inmore mundane language, deprivain a "center for educational labor," i'e.,
tion of liberty coupled with forced labor. Measures mentioned under (1)
and (2) were to be applied by administrative agencies, confinement in "a
center for educational labor" by a court of general jurisdiction.
Publication of the draft was followed by public discussion in newspapers, legal periodicals, and at meetings of various "social organizations."
The initial anti-parasite zeal slowly subsided after a few weeks and the temperature of the discussion generally went down. Occasionally, newspapers
would even publish letters to the editor raising objections to the draft, especially to its vagueness. Publications of such letters per se was an indication
that neither the editors-in-chief nor the censorship personnel had strong instructions to protect the draft from criticism.
Nevertheless, the principal decision of the Politbureau was still in force
and the routine legislative process was going on. The draft of the anti-parasite statute was approved by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the
Sejm. In March 1971, ILS organized a national academic conference on the
draft. The conference was attended not only by legal scholars but also by
sociologists, criminologists, psychiatrists, and experts on labor organization.
Two principal papers were delivered at the conference: one by Dr. Kubicki,
a brilliant legal scholar, another by a distinguished criminologist and psychiatrist Professor Batawia.182
The Kubicki paper challenged the very idea of applying state coercion
to individuals who have not violated the law. The paper further attacked
the residual vagueness of the statutory definition of a "parasite" as offensive
to the principle of legality. Such vagueness, the paper reasoned, would necessarily generate highly selective, arbitrary enforcement. The paper also attacked the idea of forced labor, inherent in the anti-parasite law, as
counterproductive and unacceptable under socialist ideology. It was likewise emphasized that forced labor is incompatible with two ILO conven83
tions: No. 29 of 1930 and No. 105 of 1957, both ratified by Poland.'
Professor Batawia presented empirical data concerning persons who
8 4
The
would fall within the definition of "parasites" proposed by the draft.'
data strongly suggested that the overwhelming majority of persons without
steady employment, labeled by the police as "persons avoiding socially useful work," were actually socially maladjusted people. The primary causes of
182. Kubicki's paper was never published. Batawia's paper appeared as an article,
Batawia, tAob/ematvka knto/ogtwzna paso.zytntctwa spolecznego, PAWSTO PRAWO (No. 7, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Problema/yka].
As an organizer of the conference I am quite familiar with Dr. Kubicki's paper, and I am
giving a brief summary of it from my memory.
183. See note 181 supra.
184. Problematyka, supra note 182.
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social maladjustment were chronic alcoholism, l8 5 personality disorder, and
mental retardation. 186 Therefore "social parasitism" presented first of all
serious medical problems. The coercive measures proposed by the draft were
a totally inadequate response to complex problems of social maladjust87
ment. 1
The lively discussion that followed the two papers attacked the draft
legislation with rare unanimity and vigor. Several discussants pointed out
that the draft was incompatible with international legislation on human
rights. It was specifically noted that the anti-parasite law would violate the
two aforementioned ILO conventions prohibiting forced labor as well as articles 8 and 15 of the Covenant.18 8 The organizers of the conference
presented the results in a long and detailed memorandum which was submitted to the Committee of Justice Administration of the Sejm.
The memorandum at once triggered some angry reactions from the supporters of the anti-parasite law. Bafia, in one of his numerous official capacities, that of the Secretary General of the Association of Polish Jurists,
denounced the memorandum for inflexible legalism.
But the Committee of Justice Administration of the Sejm, probably left
with a fair amount of freedom by the party authorities, took the expression
of collective academic wisdom more seriously. The question of compatibility
of the draft with international law, once raised, generated some further questions and inquiries. Ultimately, the anti-parasite bill was withdrawn by the
government and the issue ended there. For many people it was a pleasant
surprise.
It appears that one of the principal factors responsible for the fall of the
anti-parasite law in Poland was its incompatibility with international legislation on human rights, duly brought to the attention of the decision-makers.
This factor, of course, should not be considered in isolation, but within the
context of other circumstances. A circumstance of primary significance was
185. According to Professor Batawia, substantially more than 50% of those labeled by the
police as "avoiding socially useful work" were chronic alcoholics. Id. at 15-22.
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id. at 28.
188. Art. 8, § 3 of the Covenant, supra note 3, reads:
(a) No one shall. be required to perform forced compulsory labour;
(b) The preceding subparagraph shall not be held to preclude in countries where
imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the
performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a
competent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall
not include:
(i) Any work or service not referred to in subparagraph (b) normally required
of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a
court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious
objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life
or well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
Art. 15, § 1 reads in part: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or ommission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed."
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that the political leadership did not press very hard for anti-parasite legislation at this time. The leadership would most probably have been pleased to
see it passed, but not at too high a price.
Middle-level-party supervisors and high state officials, such as Bafia and
the then Minister of Justice Walczak, supported the draft law to the very
end. It was certainly a much safer course of action to support and advocate
an anti-parasite law than to remain reasonably balanced about it, let alone
to oppose it. Nevertheless, a reasonably free discussion on the draft was allowed. Those interested had a chance to judge the bill on its merits and to
communicate their views. Participants at the conference organized by the
Institute of Legal Sciences were willing to use this opportunity. Those who
drafted the memorandum for the Sejm Committee of Justice Administration
were willing to articulate and to convey these critical views as clearly as
possible.
The unanimity of academic opinion and the broad spectrum of specialists participating in the conference also had some significance. After all, the
new party leadership wanted to improve its relations with the intellectual
community. Ignoring strong academic opinion would not have fit well the
recently announced leadership style of "consulting society."' 189
What conclusions can one draw from the foregoing survey of changes in
Polish criminal law generated by international legislation on human rights?
The first reaction may be rather skeptical. The impact of international
law seems to be indeed very insubstantial. The draconian summary procedure has in fact been invoked only in exceptional cases; 190 hence, its repeal
should not be overestimated.
Changes in the area of the death penalty may be seen as more apparent
than real. The number of death sentences has not decreased after January 1,
1970.191 Statutory exemptions for pregnant women and minors are only
decorative because nobody would sentence to death these kinds of defendants anyway.
The most promising phenomenon has been the reform of the law on
pretrial detention. But, as partial data seem to suggest, the reform has remained largely on paper. The judiciary continues to rubber-stamp decisions
made by the prosecutors. Thus, the decision making power which statutorily
shifted, at least in part, from the procuracy to the courts, actually has remained with the procuracy. Deficiencies in the new statutory scheme, especially the ex parte nature of proceedings before the court in which only the
procurator may participate and the conspicuous lack of judicial hearing,
may explain such results to some extent.
The fall of the anti-parasite legislation is somewhat more tangible; however, it is difficult to assess the importance of negative legislative facts of this
kind. Following such a skeptical line of reasoning one may say that all the
189. "Discussions and consultations with citizens" has been recently elevated to the rank of
a constitutional principle, See Law of February 10, 1976 On the Amendment of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, art. 1,§ 42 (J.L. 1976, No. 5, Item 29).
190. S. WALTOS, supra note 108, at 34.
191. See note 119 supra.
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aforecited changes introduced into Polish criminal law have three characteristic features in common: they are changes of low cost, insubstantial practicality, but high visibility. Actually, one cannot expect more from reluctantly
espoused concessions devised primarily for foreign consumption.
The skeptical view is difficult to dispute; however, that does not account
for all the essential aspects of the story. Now, the focus will shift to the items
left out by the skeptics.
First of all, the changes in Polish criminal law proved once again that,
as Professor Humphrey said, "most governments, including authoritarian
governments, are sensitive to world public opinion."' 192 In the Polish case it
is even more striking because most of the changes were introduced in 196869, ile., during the period least favorable politically for liberal law reforms.
This fact, important per se, is also important because it encourages
those in Poland who support liberal developments in law to press harder and
to rely in their struggle on international law on human rights. The history of
"the rise and fall" of Polish anti-parasite legislation is especially instructive
in this regard.
Second, the changes actually introduced, however modest, should not
be underestimated. They had been deemed important enough by the authorities to be resisted for some twenty years against a stong current of professional, especially academic, opinion in Poland. Strikingly, they have been
also deemed important by these liberally minded academic writers, who are
93
well aware of their deficiencies.1
True, until recently, judging from available sources, statutory changes
have not altered law enforcement patterns. Nevertheless, they represent tangible potential for future changes. Assuming that there are spells of political
relaxation, it is quite reasonable to expect that the judiciary will exercise its
newly acquired power in a more independent and mature way.
Moreover, the present law is somewhat less susceptible to the rapid
twists and abusive practices characteristic of "campaigns," one of the periodically recurrent plagues of criminal law enforcement in socialist countries. 194
The repeal of the summary procedure and successful blocking of the antiparasite legislation seem to be essential to this context. Finally, recent
changes in Polish criminal law represent a challenge to those socialist legal
systems which resist law reforms along similar lines, notwithstanding their
formal international obligations.
Most notably, under Soviet criminal law the defendant is denied the
right to appeal in cases tried by the Supreme Court of the USSR as well as
by the Supreme Courts of the union republics.' 95 Pretrial detention during
192. See Humphrey, supra note 75.
193. See note 157 supra.
194. Juviler, Mass Education andjustice in Soviet Courts: The Visiting Sessions, in 18 SOVIET
STUDIEs 494 (1967); Pomorski, CrthinalLaw Protectin of Socialist froperty in the USSR, SOVIET
LAW AFrER STALIN 235 (D. Barry et al. eds. 1977); Pomorski, Communists and Their CriminalLaw
(unpublished manuscript).
195. Law of the RSFSR On the Issuance of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSRSR,
October 27, 1960, thereafter, CCP RSFSR (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1960, No.
40, Item 592), arts. 38, 325.
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preliminary investigation is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the procuracy:
there is no possibility to challenge it before the court.196 Soviet criminal law
197
still includes inherently abusive anti-parasite provisions.
II.

THE QUESTION OF COMPATIBILITY:

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED

PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN COMPARISON WITH
POLISH AND AMERICAN MUNICIPAL LAW

Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest

A.

1.

Interpretation of Article 9 of the Covenant

It is widely believed that article 9 of the Covenant is the basis for all
other rights set forth in the Covenant. The subordination to the rule of law
of all forms of arrest and detention has been called the most fundamental
human right after life itself.'98 If the right to be free from arbitrary arrest
and detention is abused or denied, there is little hope for the enjoyment of
other rights enumerated in the Covenant since arrest destroys privacy, requires separation from family, and curtails freedom of speech, movement,
and association.' 99
In spite of its importance, surprisingly little interpretive work has been
done on article 9. This is also true of the Covenant as a whole, as Hassan
writes: "One of the most urgent tasks confronting human rights advocates
today is that of formulating and analyzing the standards prescribed in the
Covenant.''20° Before one can determine the compatibility of American and
Polish law with article 9, the Covenant's meaning and standards must be
clear.
The task of determining the standards of article 9 is not an impossible
one, although the weak implementation inherent in the Covenant thwarted
the hope that world public opinion and the further growth ofjurisprudence
would determine standards. 20 However, some useful approaches to interpretation are suggested by general principles of law recognized in the principal legal systems, the concept of freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention
as developed by decisions of the European Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights, and subsequent United Nations studies encompassing article 9.202
Article 9 begins, "Everyone has the right to hberty and security ofperson."
196.

Id.at arts. 11, 96-97.

197. Law of the RSFSR on the Issuance of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, October 27,
1960, (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 40 - Item 491), art. 209.
198. J. FAWCETT, APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 57

(1969).
199. P. Hassan, Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and Detention as a Human Right: A
Study of the Meaning of the Word "Arbitrary" in Article 9 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 7-8 (1969) (unpublished dissertation in Harvard Law School Library).
200. Hassan, The International Covenants on Human Rights." An Approach to Interpretation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 35 (1969-70).
201. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
202. P. Hassan, supra note 199, at 259-63.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:4

An analogous provision opens article 5 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and has been
the subject of some discussion. 20 3 "Security of person" is a concept distinct
from "liberty" and in one view, although the scope is unsettled, probably
intends physical and legal security rather than psychological, economic, or
social.2 0 4 Another view is that liberty means actual freedom of movement of
the person and security is the condition of being protected by law in that
freedom.2 0 5 Guarantees of personal liberty in article 5 of the European Convention probably do not extend to a right to enter or reside within the jurisdiction of a contracting state and, in general, mean "a person's right not be
subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner
that does not admit of legal justification. ' 20 6 These views would be equally
applicable to the Covenant along with the view, expressed by Hassan, that
the opening sentence of article 9, paragraph 1 controls the other provisions
20 7
of the paragraph.
Article 9, paragraph 1, second sentence: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrag arrest or detention."
This provision, perhaps the most important in the Covenant, is also the
most difficult for which to formulate standards. Unaided by interpretations
of the European Convention, which rather incorporates exceptions to a provision that no one shall be deprived of his liberty, the meaning of "arbitrary"
is crucial. 20 8 In a detailed study, Hassan argues that the term "arbitrary"
was meant to have a special meaning. Arbitrary arrest and detention "implied an arrest or detention which was incompatible with the principles of
justice or with the dignity of the human person irrespective of whether it had
been carried out in conformity with the law."' 20 9 "Thus, 'arbitrary' was to
safeguard against not onl'v illegal acts but unjust acts as well." ' 2 10 Hassan concludes that "[a]rticle 9, as it presently stands, if properly interpreted and
applied, could provide better safeguards against government oppression of
'2 1 1
its peoples than any article with a detailed list of limitations."
The problem raised by this conclusion is how to interpret and apply
article 9 properly. Hassan suggests that the lack of precise definitions in
various constitutions has not prevented those documents from greatly promoting the development of liberty. The draftsmen were not bothered by the
vagueness either, believing that the terms could be interpreted by reference
to generally accepted principles of justice.2 12 However, the success of these
203. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter cited as the European Convention]. Signed at Rome, 4 November 1950; entered into force on 3 September 1953. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human
Rights: Collected Texts, § 1, Doc. 1 (7th ed. 1971).
204.

F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 92 (1974).

205. J. FAWCE'r, supra note 198, at 58.
206. Id. at 59-64.
207. P. Hassan, supra note 199, at 249.
208. European Convention, supra note 203, at art. V(l).
209. Hassan, The InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights: Backgroundand Perspective on
Arti le 9(1), 3 DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 183 (1973).
210. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 185.
212. Id. at 183-84.
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approaches seems to be based on a system of adjudication which does not
2 13
exist under the Covenant.
Later United Nations studies have attempted to define the term "arbitrary" more specifically. The United Nations Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, in the Draft
Principles, defined arrest or detention as arbitrary if it is (a) "on grounds or
in accordance with procedures other than those established by law" or (b)
"under the provisions of a law, the purpose of which is incompatible with
2 14
Point (a) is clear as
respect for the right to liberty and security of person."
it sets forth the legality principle; however, point (b) leads us no further in
determining the standards which are to be used to determine incompatibility. The Study on Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest did set forth definitions
of essential terms of article 9. Arrest is defined thus:
the act of taking a person into custody under the authority of the
law or by compulsion of another kind and includes the period from
the moment he is placed under restraint up to the time he is
competent to order his continuedcusody
brought before an2 authority
15
or to release him.
Detention will apply to "the act of confining a person to a certain place,
whether or not in continuation of arrest, and under restraints which prevent
him from living with his family or carrying out his normal occupational and
2 16
social activities."
The definition of "arbitrary arrest" was also undertaken at other United
Nations seminars. The Baguio Seminar adopted the following definitions:
Illegal arrest---curtailment, not authorized by law, either statutory
or customary, of an individual's freedom of movement. Arbitrary
arrest-an arrest authorized by a law which fails adequately to
protect human rights because either (a) the legal right to arrest has
been too widely defined, or (b) the means, circumstances or physiarrest exceed the reasonable requirecal force attendant on the
2 17
ments of effecting arrest.
Although the provision against "arbitrary" arrest and detention in article 9(1) remains vague and virtually undefined, the article is not necessarily
ineffectual in trying to determine whether a country's domestic laws are incompatible. Conceivably, there are some instances where abuse would be so
flagrant that, by reference to generally accepted principles of justice, the
United Nations community could deem it "arbitrary." More specifically,
some of the above definitions, limitations on guarantees of personal liberty in
the European Convention and the Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom
213.

See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 331 (1950),

where he suggests that even if rights are not defined in detail, they may be enforceable in the
courts.

214. United Nations, STUDY OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY
ARREST, DETENTION AND EXILE 205 (1964), [hereinafter cited as STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM
ARBITRARY ARREST].
215. Id. at 206.
216. Id.
217. United Nations, Seminar on the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and
Procedure, Baguio City, ST/TAA/HR 2 at 9 (Feb., 1958).
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from Arbitrary Arrest, suggest examining domestic legal systems for compliance with the following principles:
(a)

The definition of the legal power to arrest should not be too
broad.

(b)

Arrest or detention is allowed only if the person to be arrested
or detained is reasonablPsuspected of having committed an offense.

(c)

The offense should be serious and punishable by a penalty
involving loss of liberty.

(d)

There must exist circumstances which justify the need to keep
the suspect in custody. The circumstances are limited to
(1) danger of escape or (2) danger that the suspect would
prejudice the results of the investigation by destroying evidence, conniving with witnesses, etc.

(e)

An arrest can be made only on the authority of a written warrant issued by a judge or other official authorized by law to
exercise judicial power, except where arrest cannot be safely
delayed for the issuance of a warrant. The warrant must be
supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the issuing officer of
the existence of grounds justifying the proposed arrest.

These principles apply to persons suspected or accused of a criminal
offense. The provisions in article 9 against arbitrary arrest or detention may
apply to arrest or detention on grounds unconnected with criminal law as
well. 2 18 In brief, the Draft principles of the Study on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest provide (1) for arrest and detention of illegal aliens or an alien
with view to deportation as long as certain safeguards are observed, and
(2) for arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with a lawful court
order, detention of a minor by lawful order of a competent court or authority, detention of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, or drug addicts for the
purpose of treatment, cure or, rehabilitation, and detention of persons for
prevention of the spread of serious infectious diseases.
Safeguards for the above include the necessity of a written order of a
competent court or authority, a hearing with all guarantees necessary for the
protection of the individual's interests, systematic review of detention which
must cease as soon as the reasons which gave rise to it no longer exist.
These principles are specific enough to use in reviewing domestic laws
to determine their compliance with the Covenant.
Article 9, paragraph 1, third sentence: "No one shall be deprived of h's liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are establishedby
law."
This final sentence of article 9, paragraph 1, requires that arrest or detention be founded in law. While the language of this sentence indicates that
the legality of arrest is determined by the applicable domestic law, Hassan
218. See STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITARY ARREST, Draft Principles, supra note 214.
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219
Because the
suggests that the paragraph, as a whole, goes beyond that.
first sentence of the paragraph controls the other provisions, the laws referred to here must not be inconsistent with everyone's right to liberty and
security of person. Also, under article 2 all state parties to the Covenant
agree to adopt such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the Covenant. Thus, the laws referred to in this sentence and
article 2 are the same and must give effect to the right to liberty and security
of person. Finally, article 5 forbids state parties from taking actions aimed at
the destruction of the rights recognized in the Covenant. Therefore, not only
must arrest and detention follow domestic substantive law and procedure,
but these laws must not violate the right to liberty and security of the person
which the Covenant provides.
Article 9, paragraph 2: "Anyone who is arrested shall be tbformed, at the time

of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly tbformed of any charges
against him."
While the intention of this paragraph seems clear, interpretations of a
similar provision in the European Convention may aid our understanding. 220 The greatest difference between the two texts is that the Covenant
requires that the person arrested be informed "at the time of his arrest,"
while the European Convention requires that the prisoner be informed
"promptly." 22 1 This difference is minimal as "it appears that the intention-and the consequential obligation-is much the same, so that the conclusion seems justified that these rights are defined in substantially similar
222
terms."
The European Commission has held that there is no obligation under
223
As
this provision to present reasons for arrest or for the charge in writing.
to the conditions of form which the oral information must satisfy, it is not
necessary that it be in detail and the obligation does not exist if the circumstances are such that the person must know the general nature of the alleged
offense for which he is detained. 224 It is not necessary that technical or precise language be used, but only that the prisoner knows in substance the
reason for arrest. The Covenant does not include the requirement, as does
the Convention, that this information be given "in a language which he un22 5
derstands," but this has been found to be clearly implied.
Article 9, paragraph 3, first sentence: "Anyone arrestedor detained on a criminal charge shall be broughtpromptly before ajudge or other ocer authorized by law to
exercisejudicialpower and shall be entitled to trial wi'thin a reasonable time or to release."
219. P. Hassan, supra note 199, at 249.
220. European Convention, supra note 203, at art. 5.
221. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civit and PoliticalRights and the European Convention on Human Rights, [1968-691 43 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L L. 21, 29.
222. Id. at 29.
223. J. FAWCETr, supra note 198, at 90.
224. Id. at 91.
225. Council of Europe. Problems arising from the co-existence of the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, Report of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers 29, Strasbourg (Sept. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Commmittee of Experts].
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This first sentence of paragraph 3 of article 9 provides one of the strongest safeguards of individual liberty in the law covering arrest. In fact, the
provision deals with two different rights: the right of any individual who is
arrested to have the lawfulness of his arrest verified, and the right of any
individual who is arrested to be judged without delay. These two rights are
neither identical nor complementary, as the wording seems to imply. However, at drafting, an amendment by Israel to make a clear distinction be226
tween these two rights was rejected.
The Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest
tend to separate the provision into two discrete rights. 227 As to the right of
an arrested person to have the lawfulness of his arrest verified, the Draft
Principles provide that "promptly" means not later than twenty-four hours
from the time of arrest. 228 If for good reason a longer time is required, the
prescribed period may be extended once for a period not exceeding twentyfour hours, but only upon written authorization of a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial powers. 229 If these requirements are
230
not met, the detention is illegal and the arrested person must be released.
The judge or other officer before whom the person is brought shall decide to
23 1
release him or order his continued custody.
As to the right of the person arrested to be judged without delay, the
Draft Principles provide that no person may be detained pending investigation or trial except on written order of a judge or other officer and that
before the order may issue the suspect must be given an opportunity to be
heard. 232 The period of detention must not exceed four weeks, although it
may be extended for a further period, not to exceed four weeks, upon authorization by a judge or other officer. In no case shall the period of detention
exceed one-half of the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for
the offense with which he is charged. 233 To insure that detention is not un234
duly prolonged, a system of review is required.
The provisions of the Covenant have their counterpart in the European
Convention, so that the case law of the European Human Rights Institutions
235
may provide valuable precedents for the interpretation of the Covenant.
There are no textual differences between the Covenant and the European
Convention in this provision, aside from the more limited field of application
of the Covenant, which applies only to persons "arrested or detained on a
criminal charge."2 36 Although the guidelines set forth in the Draft Princi226. See Comments of Israel, U.N. A/C3/Sr. 863,
tion of the amendment see A/C.3/SR 866, 41.

10 and AC.3/SR867,

8. For the rejec-

227. Se STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, supra note 214, at arts. 10-12, 1315.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at art. 10.
Id.
Id. at art. 11.
Id. at art. 12.
Id. at art. 13.
Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 15.
L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 49, at 1150.
Committee of Experts, supra note 225, at 29.
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pies seem specific and easy to apply, it is interesting to note the difficulties
encountered in trying to apply the same provision of the European Convention.
The application of article 5(a) of the European Convention has created
considerable difficulties. 237 The first clause of the sentence, dealing with the
time limit within which a person held in custody on arrest must be brought
before the competent judicial officer, has not been put in issue.2 38 The general lines of practice among the contracting states vary, but seldom exceed
forty-eight hours. 239 Periods of extension, when permitted, are usually limited to the same length as the initial period. 24° The application of the second clause, requiring trial "within a reasonable time or release," has not
been so easy.
This clause initially raises the question of whether it expresses a right of
the detainee or a duty of the competent authorities. It has been determined
that the provision is a duty and the choice is up to the competent authorities
to either provide the trial within a reasonable time or release the detainee
pending trial. 241' Second, there is a question as to when the period of detention terminates. It has been decided that the period of detention lasts at
least until judgment has been delivered, although there is some division between the Court and the Commission as to whether the judgment by the
court of first instance or final judgment rendered on appeal is implied by the
24 2
provision.
It is primarily the term "a reasonable time" which has given rise to
dispute. 243 The determination of what is a "reasonable" time depends on a
number of elements in the individual case. Therefore, the Commission has
used a list of criteria to be considered. The particular circumstances taken
into account by the Commission are the grounds of detention, the length of
detention, and the character and requirements of the preparation for
trial. 244 On the other hand, the Court has reviewed the decisions of the
domestic courts on the issue of whether the detainee might escape, destroy
evidence, etc. The Court felt that international supervision should consist of
reviewing the decisions of domestic courts with regard to the conditions of
detention. 245 This divergent view of what is relevant for evaluation has led
to different conclusions of the Commission and the Court. 2 46 The problems
of interpretation encountered with article 5(3) of the European Convention
would also arise under article 9(3) of the Covenant.
Article 9, paragraph 3, second sentence: "It shall not be the generalrule that
persons awaiting trialshall be detainedin custody, but release may be subject to guaran237. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 93.
238. J. FAWCETr-, supra note 198, at 93.

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 98.
243. Id. at 97.
244. J. FAWCET-r, supra note 198, at 100.
245. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 100.
246. See Wemhoffv. Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Court H.R. WemhoffCase Series A,
Judgment of 27 June, 1968, part 21-24.
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tees to appearfor trial, at any other stage of udcialproceedngs, and, should occasion
arise,for execution of the judgment."
The Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest
provide in article 16 as follows:
1. The arrested person shall be given an opportunity to obtain his
provisional release, with or without financial security or other
conditions when he is brought before the authority competent
to order his continued detention or at any stage of the proceedings thereafter, either on his application or that of his counsel
or relatives or by authorities on their own motion. In case of
denial of provisional release, an immediate appeal or other
speedy recourse shall be available.
2.

To ensure that no person shall be denied the possibility of obtaining provisional release on account of lack of means, other
forms of provisional release than upon financial security shall
be provided, e.g., release into the custody of a responsible person or organization; release on promise not to leave a specified
address or to reside in a specified area or to appear at regular
intervals before a stated authority; release upon temporary surrender of identity papers; release upon an undertaking to appear before the authorities whenever legally summoned to do
247

SO.

Although the third paragraph essentially guarantees provision for bail,
the term itself is not mentioned, nor was the term mentioned in the European Convention. Fawcett explains that "[b]ail is not specifically mentioned, perhaps because in some contracting states [i1e., Denmark, Italy] it is
frowned on as unduly favoring persons of means, and seldom used." 248
249
However, article 5(3) of the Convention expressly presupposes this system.
The practice of bail is not exempted from supervision of the Commission
and the Court. Although it is primarily up to the domestic courts to fix the
amount of bail, this power may not be exercised arbitrarily and must be
exercised in accordance with the purpose of article 5(3).250 In Neumeister, the
Court criticized the domestic court for setting the bail solely in relation to
the amount of loss the person arrested might have caused. 251 The guarantees in article 9(3) of the Covenant and article 5(3) of the Convention are to
secure appearance of the accused for trial, not to secure amount of compensation due.
Article 9, paragraph 4: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful."
In contrast to article 9(3), which concerns arrest or detention on a crimi247.

STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, supra note 214, Draft Principles, art.

248.
249.
250.
251.

J. FAWCETT, supra note 198, at 109.
F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 102-03.
Id.
Id.

16.
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nal charge, the guarantee in article 9(4) concerns all deprivations of liberty.
This paragraph sets forth the principle ofjudicial control of every arrest and
detention regardless of its form or purpose. Even though paragraph 3 stipulates an appearance before a judicial officer, this paragraph emphasizes that
the court should determine if the arrest or detention is lawful.
Again the precedents interpreting the analogous provision in the European Convention, article 5, section 4, are helpful. The Court of Human
Rights has determined that this right to raise the question of lawfulness
before a court implies that there must always be a competent court involved
in the procedure, but that once this court has acted, no further judicial remedy is required. 252 Thus, if a court originally ordered the deprivation of
liberty (ze., by arrest warrant) no judicial remedy arises after the arrest or
detention. Moreover, the Court found in Neumeister that the procedural requirements for a "fair and public" hearing (article 6) did not apply in detention cases as it would be inexpedient and because publicity would be
contrary to the detainee's interests. 253 It is sufficient if the decision is given
by an independent and impartial court. Finally, the court in Neumeisler, and
similarly the "travaux preparatories" of the Covenant, explicitly said that a
"court" might be a tribunal which need not necessarily be a court of jus25 4
tice.
The Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest
applicable to this provision are found in article 38, and are as follows:
1. Anyone who is arrested or detained contrary to the provisions
set forth in the foregoing articles or is in imminent danger
thereof or who is denied any of the basic rights and guarantees
set forth in these articles shall be entitled to take proceedings
immediately before a judicial authority in order to challenge
the legality of his arrest or detention and obtain his release
without delay if it is unlawful, or to prevent the threatened
injury or enforce his rights.
2. The proceeding before such authority shall be simple, expeditious and free of charge. The aggrieved party, if in custody,
must be produced without delay by the official or other person
detaining him before the judicial authority before which the
recourse is taken. The onus shall be upon the detaining official
or other person to establish affirmatively the legality of his act.
3. The proceedings may be instituted by any person in the inter255
est of the aggrieved party.
Article 9, paragraph 5 states that: "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
The Draft Principles provide that:
Anyone who established affirmatively that he has been arrested or
detained in violation of the provisions set forth in the foregoing
articles shall have an enforceable right to compensation. If the per252.
253.
254.
255.

38.

Id.
Id. at 103.
Committee of Experts, supra note 225, at 30.
STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, supra note 214, Draft Principles, art.
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son causing such arrest or detention is a public official or agent of
the government, the state shall be jointly and severally 256
responsible
and compensation shall be payable from public funds.
This elaboration of article 9, paragraph 5 contrasts sharply with the
view set forth by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights of the Council
of Europe in comparing the Covenant and the Convention. The Committee
said that although the right to compensation in both instruments seems
alike, the documents differ as to the criterion on which compensation is to be
based. 257 The Covenant, in using "victim of unlawful arrest or detention,"
refers to the domestic law of each State Party, and a claim might be put
forward in case of violation of that law. 258 The Convention bases such a
claim on "a contravention of the provisions of this Article." The Committee
does note, however, that this difference would not be very important in prac25 9
tice.
Therefore, it is not unlikely that article 9, paragraph 5 will be construed
along the same lines as article 5, section 5 of the Convention. Compensation
for damage is dependent on the showing of a loss. Not only material but also
non-material or "moral" damage may be taken into account. 26° A decision
by the Commission gives some support to the idea that the use of the word
"victim" might be read as not giving a right to compensation for technical
errors unless there is proof of some special damage. 26 1 It might also mean
that only the individual, who has himself been arrested or detained, has a
262
right to compensation.
2.

American Law

With the framework of possible interpretations of article 9 of the Covenant in mind, the next step is to examine its compatibility with American
law. Since American law is the aggregate of the law of a number of jurisdictions, the differences between them will be leveled, technical detail omitted,
and a general overview of existing laws and practices presented. By proceeding through the various stages of arrest, police detention, initial appearance
and beyond, areas incompatible with the Covenant will be noted and questions will be raised as to suspect areas.
A.

Arrest: the decision to take a suspect into custody.
1.

Probable Cause

It is generally held under American law that the concept of "probable
263
cause" demands that an arrest be made for cause, not for suspicion.
Therefore, a police officer may make an arrest only if he has a reasonable
belief, based on the facts confronting him, that a crime has been committed
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at art. 40.
Committee of Experts, supra note 225, at 31.
Id.
Id.
F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 105-06.
J. FAWCET, supra note 198, at 117-18.
Id.

263.

W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 206 (1972).
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and the person to be arrested has committed it. Therefore, the only criterion
for taking a suspect into custody is the likelihood that he has committed a
felony, or in some cases, a misdemeanor. 264 As long as a jurisdiction's definition of probable cause is constitutionally adequate, the constitutional re265
quirement against unreasonable seizures of persons is satisfied.
Thus, American law appears to be consistent with the provision against
arbitrary arrest in article 9, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, which states that
the person arrested must be reasonably suspected of having committed an
offense. 266 In the sense that the standard of probable cause in the United
States is seen as preventing the police officer from arresting now and finding
the crime later, it is compatible with the Covenant. 267 The "probable
cause" requirement of evidence, however, is used not only at the arrest stage
but also to define the evidence needed to charge a suspect and hold him for
trial. 26 8 One might assume, therefore, that the requisite evidentiary standard is the same. Actually, it is current practice in the United States to
arrest in situations where more evidence must be gathered to hold the suspect for trial, and a lawful arrest may be made on the basis of evidence
26 9
insufficient to justify charging the person arrested.
Since, as will be examined later, the judge reviews evidentiary requirements necessary for charging but not for arrest, an officer may arrest on
suspicion knowing that he can meet the "probable cause" standard required
for charging later through in-custody investigation. To the extent that this
practice exists, it would circumvent article 9.
2.

Arrest Warrants

The problem of probable cause is aggravated by the approach of American law to arrest warrants. To avoid arbitrary arrest, article 9 of the Covenant calls for arrests to be made only on the authority of a written warrant,
issued by a judge or judicial officer, except where the suspect is found in
flagrante delicto or in urgent cases. The warrant must be supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the issuing officer that grounds exist justifying the
proposed arrest.
The usual rule in the United States is that a police officer may arrest,
without a warrant, one believed by the officer to be guilty of a felony or one
who committed a misdemeanor in his presence. 2 70 In a recent case, the
264. 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 62, 63 (12th ed. 1974). As regulated by statute in many states, a peace officer is allowed to make an arrest, without a warrant,
for a felony even though it was not committed in his presence. Such an arrest may be made
when he has reasonable ground to believe that a felony was committed and reasonable ground
to believe that the person arrested committed the felony. Id. § 62. But set text accompanying
note 274 infia. In the case of a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of an officer, an
arrest warrant must ordinarily be procured. Id. § 63.
265. Id. § 51.
266. For this and subsequent references to interpretations of article 9, see text accompanying notes 214-18 supra.
267. J. CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 13 (1975).
268. W. LA FAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 11 (1965).
269. Id. at 6, 11.

270.

d.
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United States Supreme Court stated that although maximum protection of
individual rights could best be assured by requiring review by a magistrate
of the factual justification prior to any arrest, the Court would not require
such review because it would intolerably handicap legitimate law enforcement. 2 7 1 The Supreme Court has also noted that when a felony arrest effected in a public place is questioned, the inquiry is whether there was
probable cause for arrest, not whether there was a warrant or time to get
one.2 72 Until April 1980, the Court has never invalidated an arrest based on
2 73
probable cause because officers failed to secure a warrant.
In requiring an arrest warrant, article 9 assumes that the reviewing judicial officer will bring careful, neutral judgment to the decision. Not only are
arrest warrants seldom used in the United States, but when they are used,
the participation of the judicial officer is generally a formality with little or
no attention given to whether an adequate basis exists for making an arrest. 274 Since in the majority of cases the warrant is issued after the arrest
has been made, for use as a charging document, the role of the prosecutor is
important and that of the judicial officer is insignificant.2 75 Only recently,
the Court qualified its current practice on arrest warrants. The Court held
that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect's
home to make a routine felony arrest.2 76 Apparently, warrentless arrests
made outside a suspect's home are still valid.
3.

Need for Custody

Except for the most minor regulatory or traffic violations, the automatic
response of American police acting without a warrant is to formally arrest
the suspect. 2 77 Article 9 of the Covenant presupposes that there are only
certain circumstances which justify physically seizing the accused and keeping him in custody (e.g., danger of escape or danger that the arrestee would
hamper the investigation by destroying evidence or conniving with witnesses). In the United States "[a]lmost no thought is given to the question
whether, in any given case, there is a need for custody or whether, on the
other hand, society's interests might be just as well or better served if the
accused were to be issued a citation. ' 2 78 Since the sole criterion for arrest
under American law is probable cause, and since no "need for custody" deci2 79
sion is made, this standard is not met.
271. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).
272. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976).
273. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 113.
274. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 8.
275. Id. at 34.
276. Payton v. New York, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980). Recent attempts have been made to establish standards in this area. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1
(1975) [hereinafter cited as ALl PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE].
277. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRAIL RELEASE 31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as

ABA

PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS].

278. Id.
279. Teitelbaum, Some Comparative Aspects of Pr-Tn'al Seizure of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 5
REVUE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME 419, 421 (1972).
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The American criminal justice administration has been criticized for
arresting too many persons who would voluntarily appear in court. 280 Still,
few state statutes authorize the police to issue a citation instead of making
the arrest, 281 or allow the magistrate to issue a summons rather than an
arrest warrant. 28 2 Although recent suggestions for reform allow for much
broader use of the citation and summons in an attempt to minimize holding
persons in custody prior to the initial court appearance, 283 implementation
of such reform is questionable as long as the legality of search and seizure or
284
interrogation is dependent upon making a prior arrest.
4.

Seriousness of Offense

Article 9 provides further safeguards against arbitrary arrest by permitting arrest only where the offense is serious and punishable by loss of liberty.
Since, in America, voluntary appearance is generally limited to minor violations of traffic laws or administrative regulations, almost all persons against
whom the criminal process is invoked are taken immediately into custody,
regardless of the seriousness of the offense. The American predeliction to
arrest under most circumstances is contrary to article 9.
Some of the reasons arrest is used, even for minor offenses, were discussed above. In addition, arrest for minor offenses continues since the
American police: (a) are hesitant to openly exercise their discretion; (b) seldom feel they have enough facts on which to make an informed judgment as
to whether a defendant should be cited or arrested; (c) know that arrest commonly serves as the bases for certain kinds of investigatory procedures; and
(d) consider that public safety or physical well-being of the accused often
dictates arrest in relatively minor matters. Attempts at reform in this area
would make a citation mandatory when the total imprisonment for the offense charged may not exceed six months. 285 American practice is also contrary to article 9 inasmuch as arrest is used for a myriad of other reasons,
such as: minimization of the necessity of future police action; maintenance
of respect for the police and the public image of full enforcement; punishment of a person suspected of other criminal activity; and aiding in the in286
vestigation of another offense or offender.
5.

Noncriminal Activity

Finally, at the arrest stage, mention should be made of arrests for noncriminal activity. For example, article 9 allows for arrest and detention of an
alcoholic for the purpose of treatment, cure, or rehabilitation. Such action is
safeguarded by requiring a written court order, a hearing which guarantees
the protection of the individual's interests, and a systematic review of such
280. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 166.
281. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at 31.
282.

W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 169.

283. See ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 2.1; ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE § 120.2 (commentary), supra note 276.
284.

W.

LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 168.

285. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 2.2(b).
286. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 144-52.
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detentions. In American practice, drunks are quite often taken into custody
against their will and held at the precinct until sober, usually the next morning.28 7 Legislatures have seldom addressed themselves to such practices, but
even if it is deemed proper, there is sentiment for requiring that the decision
be made by a judicial officer. 288 Even in circumstances where a judicial
hearing is available, its abbreviated nature probably does not comply with
article 9.
B.

Police Detention
1.

Reasons for Arrest

After the suspect is arrested in the United States, he is taken to the
station and detained. Article 9, paragraph 2 provides that the arrestee be
informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest. While at common law no such notification was required, statutes in the United States
changed the common law rule by imposing the duty on the officer arresting
without warrant to make some explanation while arresting, including the
cause of arrest. 289 Although stating the reasons for an arrest is considered a
common requirement under American law, 29° there is evidence that it is not
29 1
necessarily observed by arresting officers.
2.

Prompt Appearance

Another standard mandated by article 9 is that the arrestee be
promptly informed of any charges against him and promptly brought before
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. Under
American law, it is the judicial officer who informs the suspect of the charges
against him, so the two requirements will be treated together.2 92 In current
practice, the prosecutor indicates his decision to charge by issuing a postarrest warrant prior to the first regular appearance of the defendant before a
293
judicial officer, who then advises him of the charge from the warrant.
Since American law does provide for an appearance before a judicial
officer and a reading of the charge, its compatibility with article 9 turns on
the word "promptly." As noted in the interpretation of article 9, the Draft
Principles would restrict the time limit to not later than twenty-four hours
from the time of arrest, unless extended for good reason by a judicial officer;
287. Id. at 439-49.
288. Id.
289. ALl MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1,

1928) [hereinafter cited as ALI

MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 128 (1965); 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 189.

290. ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 276, at § 120.8, Comment. The commentary states that it included "[t]he common requirement that the officer inform the arrested
person of the 'cause of arrest' and of 'the authority to make it' . . . since it is desirable that a
person who is subjected to the significant restraint of liberty which an arrest imports should at
the outset know the authority and cause for that restraint." Id.
291. ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 289, at § 120.8.
292. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 1.4. "The term 'first appearance' describes the proceeding at which the first judicial officer before whom he is brought
advises the defendant of his constitutional rights and the charges against him .
Id. at 30.
293. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 308.

19801

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW

whereas under the European Convention forty-eight hours has been deemed
acceptable.
Although some American jurisdictions provide for a statutory time
limit, most provide that the suspect be presented before a judicial officer
"without unnecessary delay" or some similar requirement. 294 In many cases
the defendant makes his appearance before the magistrate on the day of the
arrest or the next morning. However, where in-custody investigation is
2 95
needed, the practice is to detain the suspect for up to seventy-two hours.
The Supreme Court, in construing a federal statute providing for an appearance "without unnecessary delay," held that the arresting officers are allowed little more leeway than the normal interval between arrest and the
ordinary administrative steps required to bring a suspect before the nearest
available magistrate. 29 6 This interpretation is not binding on states with a
similar statute when their law is not in accord. 29 7 An offender may be
brought to court prior to his scheduled appearance by a writ of habeas
298
corpus, but it is not usually used.
C.

The Initial Appearance and Beyond
1.

Lawfulness of Arrest

Article 9, paragraph 4 provides that anyone arrested or detained shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court so that the court may decide
on the lawfulness of his arrest and order his release if it is not lawful. In the
United States, the legality of an arrest would depend upon a showing of
probable cause. It might be assumed that this requirement is met when the
defendant is first brought before ajudicial officer. In fact, the initial appearance does not involve a review by the magistrate of the grounds for the warrant nor must the prosecutor demonstrate that there are sufficient grounds to
charge the suspect.2 99 The legality of the defendant's seizure is not consid3° °
ered at the initial appearance.
Theoretically, a writ of habeas corpus should be a method by which the
suspect may challenge the validity of his detention. He would do this by
showing that the grounds for his arrest are not sufficient or that a reasonable
amount of time for in-custody investigation has passed and that he should be
released. Actually, neither purpose is served by the writ; the judge, rather
than inquiring into the validity of the detention, generally determines, by
294. Id. at 300-01.
295. Id. at 306.
296. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) (interpreting FED. R. CRIM. P.

5(a)).
297.

ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 276, at132-50.

To the extent that the state courts have considered these early appearance statutes, the dominant tenor of their decisions is to the effect that the need for some investigation of crime (including non-coercive questioning) may justify a period of
stationhouse custody and consequently some delay in taking the arrested person before
a magistrate. Beyond this, cases leave entirely indeterminate large areas relating to
the lawfulness, duration and conditions of pre-production custody.
Id. at 135-36 (footnote omitted).
298. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 176.
299. Id. at 322.
300. Teitelbaum, supra note 279, at 448.
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rule of thumb, a time limit within which the police must charge or release
the subject. 30 1 If the suspect is charged, the next procedural step would be
the initial appearance which has previously been shown to be ineffective in
determining the validity of the arrest or detention.
At the initial appearance, a determination of pretrial release is made. If
the defendant is detained, the next procedural appearance before a judicial
officer is the preliminary hearing or examination. At this stage, the magistrate checks only the charging decision, not the arrest, to determine that an
offense was committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the
30 2
defendant committed the crime, so that he can hold the suspect for trial.
Again the requirements of article 9 are not met since the lawfulness of the
arrest is not checked.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty through pretrial
detention. 30 3 This probable cause determination may be made by a judicial
officer without an adversary hearing and any procedure is acceptable as long
as it provides a fair and reliable determination of probable cause either
before or promptly after arrest. 30 4 Therefore, in the absence of a preliminary hearing, all that is really required here is an arrest warrant; the result is
that "the probable cause hearing becomes susceptible to the rubber stamping habits of hurried magistrates." 30 5 On its face, this procedure meets the
requirement of article 9, paragraph 4 that a competent court be involved
somewhere in the procedure to check the lawfulness of the arrest. However,
in view of the perfunctory nature of judicial involvement with arrest warrants, and the fact that at the preliminary hearing probable cause is based
on the evidence at that time rather than at the time of arrest, the lawfulness
of the arrest is never really determined and the purpose of the provision is
30 6
not complied with.
2.

Pretrial Release: Bail

Article 9, in keeping with its overall premise that liberty is the preferred
condition, provides that persons should not be detained pending trail; however, release may be subject to guarantees to appear. Nonmonetary forms of
provisional release are to be provided. Monetary provisional release must
301. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 407-09. Since the writ challenges the validity of the
detention rather the legality of the arrest, it is not appropriate to use the writ to challenge an
arrest on insufficient grounds if at the time of the hearing there is sufficient evidence of guilt.
Even if hearings are held shortly after arrest, with only the evidence available to the arresting
officer, detention is not challenged on grounds that the arrest is illegal as defense attorneys feel
that this would be inappropriate and judges have indicated that there should be time for investigation.
302. Id. at 321.
303. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
304. Id. at 120-25.
305. Comment, PretnalDetaineesHave a Fourth Amendment Right to a Nonadversay,]JudcialDetermination oflobable Cause, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 199, 208 (1975).
306. It should be noted that some states have gone beyond the Gerstein case and ordered a
judicial hearing even if an arrest warrant had issued and sometimes require that it be an adversary hearing. Id at 215 n.87.
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not be arbitrary or compensatory. Rather, it should be limited to an amount
sufficient to secure the suspect's appearance at trial.
The United States has traditionally applied one system of provisional
release-bail.30 7 The defendant must post a monetary bond sufficiently
high, but not higher than the amount necessary, to assure his appearance at
trial. 308 Those who cannot financially afford bail, or due to the nature of the
offense are not allowed bail, are detained in jail pending trial.30 9 The Constitution recognizes bail by simply requiring that it not be "excessive"; nothing in the Constitution "suggests whether the accused has a right to be at
liberty on bail before trial, or even have bail set for him at all."' 3 10 The
Supreme Court has interpreted "excessive" to mean an amount that is more
than necessary to assure the defendant's appearance at trial. 3 11
To the extent that American courts have adopted such a narrow view of
pretrial release alternatives and seldom resort to nonmonetary controls over
the defendant, American law is incompatible with the Covenant which provides that other forms of pretrial release rather than monetary must be provided. 31 2 On the other hand, federal and state courts have held that the
only valid basis for requiring bail or setting high bail is the risk of nonappearance at trial. 3 13 On its face, this portion of American law appears to be
in accord with article 9; however, current practices show that this is not the
case.
Bail is usually set at the defendant's first appearance before a magistrate. The American bail system is frequently attacked as arbitrary, as no
effort is made to develop facts about the defendant's condition and background which would show whether the defendants could be released safely
without bail.3 1 4 Further, since it is virtually impossible to translate risk into
307.

Panel, Bai

Preveniiwe Detentzon and Speedy Trals, 8 COLUM. J.L. &Soc.

PROB. 1, 7

(1971) (remarks of H. Richard Uviller) [hereinafter Colum. Panel]. For a comprehensive discussion of various reform efforts, see J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL
AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 passim (1979).

308. Id.
309. In 1970, an estimated 100,000 persons in the United States were detained each day,
pending trial. See Comment, The Conditions ofltre- Trial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
310. Colum. Panel, supra note 307, at 7. The Constitution's enigmatic reference to bail is,
according to Mr. Andreoli, a vacuum in which
jurisdictions have gone their several ways, some deeming offenses "non-bailable," some
according the trial judge unencumbered discretion over whether or not to fix bail for
certain offenses and some seeking to encourage pre-trial release by setting forth various
terms of recognizance other than the traditional secured money bond. The constitutions or declarations of rights of many of the states provide that all persons shall be
bailable by suflicent sureties, except in certain cases. See Corbo v. Donahue, 54 N.J.
Super. 575, 149 A.2d 828 (1959).
311. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). The Court in Boyle declared that the traditional
standards as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be applied in each
case to each defendant:
If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the
judgment of the commission of the court orjudge, or justice will insure the presence of
the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give
bail and the character of the defendant.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). For a further discussion, see J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 307, at 19, 32.
312.

ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at 26.

313. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 177.
314. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at 2. A concern for defendants'
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monetary terms, bail is set according to a schedule based on the charge. 3 15
Although the predominant criterion recognized in setting bail is the
likelihood that the suspect will appear for trial, as demanded by article 9, the
uncontrolled discretion of the magistrate results in the current practice of
3 16
denying release for reasons other than those recognized by the formal law.
By manipulating the system, which on its face does not so provide, judges
achieve a system of preventive detention. They may deny bail when permitted or set it unattainably high whenever incarceration is deemed appropriate. 3 17 Because the question of bail is viewed as a matter for the lower court
to resolve in its discretion, and because the judge's ruling will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion, the judge has much
31 8
leeway.
Reasons given for manipulation of the bail system to reach improper
ends include: a fear by judges that the defendant will engage in criminal
activity if he is temporarily released on bail before trial; an apprehension
that evidence may be interfered with; the view that a taste of jail would do
the defendant good; the degree to which the alleged crime shocks the sensibilities of the community; and the possible discrimination against minority
groups. 3 19 "The net effect is to punish a defendant before his guilt has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, although this is contrary to basic
law. "320
The Supreme Court has never directly answered the question whether
the Constitution permits confinement of a suspect because of a prediction
that he may engage in harmful conduct at a future time. 32 1 Preventive detention, in the sense of a statutory scheme where arrested persons are held in
custody to prevent future crimes, must be distinguished from the "de facto
preventive detention" which takes place when the bail system is used for this
purpose. 322 De facto preventive detention contains no clearly articulated
criteria for determining when the prisoner should be detained pending
3 23
trial.
Many of the deficiencies of the United States bail system mentioned
above have been the subject of activity in bail reform at both state and fedpotential danger has been voiced in case law and legislation. See J. GOLDKAMp, supra note 307,
at 27 passn.
315. Id. at 55.
316. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 206-07.
317.

R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM, A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 12 (1965).

"Most states allow bail to sufficient sureties before conviction except for capital crimes. A few
states limit the power to deny bail in murder and treason cases. A few grant an absolute right to
bail in misdemeanor cases, and a few allow the judge absolute discretion to grant or deny bail in
accord with the common law." Id. at 28.
318. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 185.
319. S. AscH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 88 (1967).
320. Id. at 89.
321. Individual justices have nonetheless addressed the issue. See Dershowitz, Preventle Confrement: A Suggested Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1973).
322. Colum. Panel, supra note 307, at 9. For recent empirical findings regarding defacto
preventive detention through bail, see J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 307, at 163 passim.
323. Manipulation of the bail setting process to prevent pretrial release for the purpose of
protecting the public has been held unlawful. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 348, 508 P. 2d 721,
723, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1975).
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eral levels in the past two decades. 324 Alternatives to monetary bail, such as
recognizance release, are becoming more widespread. 325 Although efforts
are being made to push the American system in the direction of article 9,326
much remains to be done before American law is in compliance.
3.

Trial Within a Reasonable Time

Article 9 of the Covenant also provides that anyone arrested or detained
on a criminal charge shall be entitled either to trial within a reasonable time
or to release. Some guidelines interpreting this provision state that detention
pending investigation or trial must be based on a written order of a judge or
judicial officer, that the suspect must be given the opportunity to be heard,
that detention should not exceed four weeks except where an extension for
an additional four weeks is authorized, that detention should not exceed one
half of the minimum time of imprisonment for the offense, and that there be
a system of review to guard against unduly prolonged detention.
In applying these guidelines to American law, some discrepancies based
on previous observations are immediately apparent. Suspects are often detained pending investigation without a written order as arrests are often
made without warrants. Moreover, post-arrest warrants often are not issued
until long after the suspect was detained. In any case, the perfunctory nature of judicial involvement with warrants and the inability of the suspect to
be heard would render the document unacceptable. In addition, where the
defendant does not have an opportunity to be heard at either the initial
appearance or preliminary hearing, the guidelines of the Covenant are not
met. There is no automatic system whereby the pretrial detention of a suspect is systematically reviewed.
The most crucial aspect of this provision is the period of detention and
the term "trial within a reasonable time." Although the United States Constitution and most state constitutions provide that the accused has a right to
327
It
a speedy trial, the boundaries of such a guarantee are far from clear.
has been stated that the current American system cannot guarantee to the
accused a trial within six months of the date he has announced he is ready
328
for trial.
The concept of a right to a speedy trial in the United States has been
ambiguous and, until recently, could only be defined in the context of the
special circumstances of individual cases. 3 29 There was no absolute guaran324. Pettine, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattanto California, 5 PAC. L. J. 675
(1970). ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 317.
325. J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 307, at 70-73. As many as 47% of defendants were released
without cash bail in Philadelphia. Id. at 139.
326. The ABA Standards on Pretrial Release call for release as a general rule, relegate
money bail to the place of last resort and disallow its use for preventive detention. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 5.
327. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS].
328. Colum. Panel, supra note 307, at 3, 4.

329. Chepiga,

Speedy Tnals: Recent Developments Concerning a Vital Right, 4 FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 351 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Chepiga].
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tee that the defendant would be tried within a short time of his arrest, as this
right was seen to be "consistent with delays." ' 330 The Supreme Court has
refused to hold that the sixth amendment requires trial within a specified
33 1
time and has used a less precise balancing test.
The Supreme Court indicated that its inaction was due to a hesitation
to engage in judicial legislation. 332 In light of the benefits to society as a
whole, as well as to the accused, Congress responded to the courts' inaction
by attempting to implement the sixth amendment through the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, which defines actual time limits within which trials have to be
held. Starting in 1979, all federal courts must assure: the filing of an information or indictment within thirty days of arrest or summons, arraignment
within ten days of the filing date, and, where a not guilty plea has been
entered, trial within sixty days of arraignment. 333 If the defendant is not
brought to trial within the requisite time period, the court must dismiss the
334
case either with or without prejudice.
The federal courts are closer to the safeguards envisioned by article 9
inasmuch as the Speedy Trial Act provides for definite time limits, although
they exceed the suggested four weeks. Twenty-eight states, on the other
hand, still express the time limitation by reference to terms of court, the
number of terms varying from one to three. 335 Approximately nineteen do
have a definite calendar period, ranging from 60 to 180 days, and a few
states do not fix a definite period but employ a broad standard of reasonableness. 336 A violation of the state statute is rarely seen as a constitutional
denial, and there are considerable differences and uncertainties as to when
time begins to run, which defendants are covered, and what the consequences of delay are. 3 37 Standards whose purposes are to create uniformity,
provide that the consequence of a denial of speedy trial should be outright
dismissal; however, they fail to prescribe specific time limits. 338
4.

Compensation

Finally, article 9 of the Covenant provides that anyone who has been a
victim of unlawful arrest or detention should have an enforceable right to
330. Id.
331. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 (1972); Poulos & Coleman, Speedy TIal, Sow
Implementation: ABA Standardsin Search ofStatehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 361 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Poulos].
332. 407 U.S. at 523.
333. Chepiga, supra note 329, at 362.
334. Holt, Federal System Adopts Speicfw ParametersFor the ConstitutionalRight to a Speedy TrilSpeedy Trial Act of 1974, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 449, 453 (1976).
335. Note, The Impact of the Speedy Trial Provisions. A Tentative Appratal, 8 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 356, 363-4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Speedy Trial Provisions].
336. Id. at 373-74.
337. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 327, at 2, 14.
Instead of dealing with the constitutional right, speedy trial litigation proceeds with reference to such statutes or court rules. Speedy Trial Provistons, supra note 335, at 361. Statutes of a
few states limit their operation to imprisoned defendants or only to felonies. Id. at 364. Also,
there are at least five general positions among the states on the remedy question. Id. at 362-63.
The definite time period is computed from a specific event which differs from state to state. Id.
at 361. See also Poulos, supra note 331, at 377.
338. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 327, at 2, 14.

1980]

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW

compensation. Further, if a public or government official is involved, the
state is jointly and severally liable and compensation will be payable from
public funds.
In the United States, a victim of arrest or imprisonment may bring a
tort action against a police officer, alleging that he made an arrest on insufficient grounds or improperly detained the person following his arrest. 339 The
effectiveness of this remedy is questionable. Tort actions are seldom used
because there is no source of monetary recovery, police officers lack assets,
there are limited bonding requirements, and the doctrine of governmental
340
immunity applies.
Governmental immunity in the United States is in direct conflict with
the requirement of article 9 that the state be liable and payment be made
from public funds. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is
not liable for any claim of false arrest or imprisonment. 34 1 There is no governmental liability in tort unless the government consents. 342 Since a police
operation is a governmental function, cities and states are not liable for the
torts of their officers. 343 Even though the degree of consent varies from state
to state, there is ordinarily no liability for the torts of police officers, such as
false arrest. 344 Although there has been substantial erosion of governmental
immunity recently, it still would be difficult to say that a victim of unlawful
arrest or detention in the United States has a meaningful right to compensa34 5
tion.
This incompatibility of American law with requirements of article 9,
paragraph 5 has been recently admitted officially by the State Department.
In effect, the State Department recommends that the Covenant be ratified
by the United States with the reservation that, "the United States does not
adhere to paragraph (5) of Article 9 . . . ",346 Since this is the only recommended reservation pertaining to article 9, it follows that the State Department believes American law compatible with all the remaining paragraphs
339. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 412.
340. Id. at 421.
341.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 972 (4th ed. 1971).

342. Id. at 975.
343. E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 415 (1967). "Thus it is held that a chief or superintendant is not liable for acts of his policeman in perpetrating a false arrest or imprisonment,
since such acts were performed in carrying out the city's governmental function, under which
neither the municipality, its officials nor its police officers can be held civilly liable." Id.
344. W. PROSSER, supra note 341, at 979.
345. Id. at 984-87.
The immunity of state and local governments for their torts has been subject to criticism
which is now having its effect. There has been general erosion by expanding "proprietary"
activities (that is, those activities of municipal corporations which are not governmental, political or public but rather corporate and private for which it is liable) and also by statute. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recently substantially limited the immunity of local governments. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct. 1389 (1980); Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). See also Klein, Recent Developments, 24 VILL. L.
REV. 1028 (1978-1979). The impact of these developments on the implementation of the right
to compensation by the victims of unlawful arrests or detentions seems to be insignificant. Id. at
1031.
346. Letter of Submittal, Dec. 17, 1977, Message from the President, supra note 16, at XII.
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of this article. In view of our analysis, however, such an assumption seems to
be unfounded.
3.

Polish Law
A.

Arrest: the decision to take a suspect into custody
1.

Probable Cause

The Polish CCP explicitly spells out two conditions under which the
right of the police to arrest a suspected person arises: (a) a reasonable belief
that such person committed a crime; and (b) a danger that the suspect would
hide or tamper with evidence. 347 The concept of "a reasonable belief,"
clearly analogous to the much celebrated American concept of "probable
cause," has received little attention from Polish authorities. The Supreme
Court of Poland, has never tried to give the concept a precise or operational
meaning. Commentators usually dispose of the problem easily in a few
sentences. There is some consensus that under article 206 a "frivolous" suspicion on the part of the policeman making an arrest is insufficient. An
arresting officer has to have some kind of affirmative information, either
firsthand or from other persons, which justifies the suspicion that the ar348
rested person committed a crime.
2.

Need for Custody

In addition to the requirement of probable cause (reasonable belief),
there must be a danger that the suspected person would hide or tamper with
evidence. In other words, reasonable belief is a necessary condition for an
arrest but is insufficient when standing alone.
3.

Arrest Warrants

The police are vested with an independent power of arrest on the
grounds provided for by the CCP in article 206; no arrest warrant by the
349
judicial or prosecutorial officer is required.
4.

Seriousness of Offense

Article 206 of the CCP, if applied literally, would allow for arrest in
every criminal case, including cases of even the most trivial offenses; hence, it
would not be compatible with the requirements of article 9 of the Covenant.
It has been pointed out by authoritative commentators, however, that the
power of arrest should not be broader than the power to apply pretrial detention. 350 It follows that the police may not arrest in cases involving of347. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 206. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure,
everyone has a right to arrest a person caught tflagrante dicto or in hot pursuit. Id. at art. 205.

348. Kodeks postepowania karnego. KOMENTARZ 277 (M. Mazur ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Mazur]; M. S1EWIERSKI, T. TYLMAN & M. OLSZEWSKI, POSTEPOWANIE KARNE W
ZARYSIE 167 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as M. SIEWARSKII.
349. In addition to the arrest power provided for by art. 206, arrest, of course, may be made
in the execution of an arrest warrant issued by the court or by the prosecutor. CCP, supra note
67, at art. 208.
350. See notes 359-81 infia and accompanying text.
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fenses punishable only by imprisonment of up to one year or punishable by
noncustodial sanctions unless it is impossible to establish the identity of the
35
suspected person. '
5.

Noncriminal Activity

The police have the power to arrest in a variety of situations unrelated
to criminal proceedings. For example, a person accused of certain noncrimi352
nal offenses, which are under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies,
may be arrested; a person "violating public order" 353 may be arrested; a
drunk may be detained and treated in "sobriety chambers"; 354 and a person
may be arrested in execution of detention orders issued by an administrative
355
agency.
B.

Police Detention
1.

Notification of the Reasons for Arrest

Polish law does not require that the arrestee be informed at the time of
arrest
of the reasons for his arrest. This omission clearly makes Polish law
his
incompatible with article 9, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
2.

Prompt Appearance

An arrestee may be detained by the police for a period of forty-eight
hours. During this period either a warrant for an arrestee's continuous detention should be served or he should be released. The warrant may not be
356
Even
issued without an appearance of the arrestee before the procurator.
within the period of forty-eight hours, the arrestee should be released if the
need for his detention disappears. 3 57 Immediately after the arrest is made,
police should start gathering the necessary data, and if grounds for continuous detention are found, should make an appropriate motion to the procurator. Supervision over the arrest/detention practices of the police is exercised
358
by the procurator or the court.
C.

Preliminary Detention

Polish law makes a clear distinction between arrest and detention for a
short period of time on the one hand 359 and prolonged detention on the
other. The latter, called "preliminary detention" (in Polish: tymczasowe
351. Mazur, supra note 348, at 278, 296. This principal limitation of the power to arrest is
subject, in turn, to some exceptions. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 447.
352. The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses, supra note 69, at art. 141.
353. Edict of Dec. 21, 1955, On the Organization and Scope of Activity of the Civil Militia,
J.L. 1955, No. 46, Item 311, art. 7, sec. 1(2).
354. Order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mar. 8, 1961, J.L. 1961, No. 21, Item 104.
355. Administrative agencies may order imprisonment as a penalty for noncriminal offenses
and may issue civil commitment orders for the mentally ill.
356. See CCP, supra 67, at art. 207.
357. Id. art. 206.
358. Id. art. 216.
359. See notes 347-58 supra and accompanying text.
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360
while
aresztowanze) may be applied only by the procurator or by the court,
depreliminary
on
focus
now
will
We
the
police.
to
the former is entrusted
tention.

1.

Probable Cause

Preliminary detention may be applied only to a person formally
36 1
This very fact implies the existence of
charged with a criminal offense.
probable cause since formal charges may be made only on the grounds of
evidence (not informal information) which makes it probable that the suspect committed a crime. 362 Some authorities suggest that the probable
be even stronger than the
cause required for preliminary detention must 363
probable cause required for a charging decision.
2.

Need for Custody

Preliminary detention may be applied only when, in addition to proba364
ble cause, there is a need for protecting the integrity of the proceedings.
This is particularly so when: (1) there is a reasonable ground to believe that
the defendant would hide or escape, especially when he does not have a
definite place of residence or it is impossible to establish his identity; or
(2) there is a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant would connive
3 65
or (3) the
with the witnesses or otherwise interfere with the proceedings;
36 7
366
or (4) the defendor is a recidivist;
defendant is charged with a felony
368
In
ant is charged with an act representing a high degree of social danger.
all of the above-mentioned situations, preliminary detention may be applied,
but is not required. Mandatory detention applies only to the defendants
who were convicted and sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment for a
imprisonment for a
term of more than two years for crimes of intent or to 369
negligence.
of
crimes
for
years
three
than
more
term of
3.

Seriousness of the Offense

Preliminary detention does not apply in trivial cases; that is, in cases
involving offenses punishable by imprisonment of up to one year or by non360. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 210.
361. Id. arts. 61, 209, 210.
362. Id. art. 269; Mazur, supra note 348, at 363.
363. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 209. Decision of the Supreme Court, May 14, 1974,
(1974) OSNIKiW, No. 9, Item 175; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 170.
364. See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 209, 217.
365. To apply preventive detention on the grounds specified under (1) and (2), it is necessary to establish some facts about the defendant's conduct to this effect. Mazur, supra note 348,
at 296; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 173.
366. A felony is a crime punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of not less than
three years. See C.C., supra note 66, at art. 5, § 2.
367. See C.C., supra note 66, at arts. 60-65.
368. In situations specified under (3) and (4), the need for custody is presumed because the
severity of the anticipated punishment presumably represents sufficient temptation for escape or
tampering with evidence. The personality of the recidivist is presumed to be a menace to the
regularity of the proceedings. M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 174.
369. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 217, § 3.
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3 70
custodial penalties such as a fine, or correctional labor.

4.

The Decision-Making Process and the Duration of
Detention

The initial decision on preliminary detention during investigation is
made by the procurator either on motion by the police or on his own initiative. 371 Before preliminary detention is applied, the procurator has to interrogate the defendant personally. This rule guarantees that within fortyeight hours from the time of the arrest the defendant is physically produced
before the procurator. The initial period of detention may not exceed three
months. 372 The decision is subject to review by the court which has jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a complaint by the defendant or his
counsel. 373 If preliminary investigation by prosecutorial authorities, due to
the peculiar circumstances of the case, cannot be completed within the three
month period, the period of preliminary detention may be extended if necessary. The power to extend preliminary detention for a period of up six
374
whose decision is subject to
months is vested in a provincial procurator,
review by a provincial court upon complaint by the defendant or his counsel. 375 The defendant has no right to appeal the decisions of the reviewing
3 76
courts; however, such decisions may be appealed by the procurator.
The power to extend preliminary detention beyond six months, for a
period "necessary to complete the investigation" is vested in a provincial
court which acts upon a motion by a provincial procurator. A decision by a
provincial court on this matter may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
both parties. 377 All the courts involved make their decisions in ex parte proceedings, in which only a procurator may participate. A hearing is not held
and the factual basis for the decision is evidence gathered by the investiga378
tion and submitted to the court in a dossier.
Under the above-outlined statutory scheme, a crucial question arises.
Namely, what have been the patterns of actual official behavior? Especially,
how have the Polish courts used their control over preliminary detention?
The scarce empirical data available and some of the published Supreme
Court decisions seem to suggest that the judiciary has applied preliminary
detention very broadly.
And so, for example, in 1971 the Provincial Court in Wroclaw received 9 complaints about extensions of preliminary detention up
to 6 months by the provincial procurator and ruled in all the cases
against the complaining defendants. At the same time, the court
was petitioned by the procurator for an extension of preliminary
detention beyond 6 months in 39 cases, involving 103 prisoners,
370. Id. § 2; Mazur, supra note 348, at 296.
371. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 206, § 3.
372.
373.
374.

Id. art. 173.
Id. art. 212, § 2; Mazur, supra note 348, at 290; M. SIEWARSKI, supra note 348, at 174.
A provincial procurator is the head of the procuratorial office at the intermediate level.
See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 222, § 3.

375.
376. Id. art. 212, § 3.
377. Id. art. 222, § 3.
378. Id. art. 88 & 299, § 1; Bafia el al., supra note 157, at 268.
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and granted all the petitions. Fifteen of the prisoners appealed79the
3
decisions to the Supreme Court, which affirmed all of them.
The high regard for the needs of the investigation and relaxed standards of
application of preliminary detention have been reflected in some of the published decisions by the Supreme Court. In its officially reported decision of
February 1, 1975,380 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Provincial Court in Lublin and ordered the release of the prisoner under the following circumstances.
The prisoner, Adam B., charged with a non-violent offense, had
been detained for a period of more than 2 years. The Provincial
Court in Lublin extended preliminary detention five times, having
been upheld by the Supreme Court twice. Only the last extension,
as appears from the opinion utterly frivolous, was finally reversed.
It is characteristic that the Supreme Court, having ultimately ruled for the
prisoner, did not try to draw any line in terms of permissible duration of the
detention. The opinion does not even hint that a preliminary detention in
excess of two years is per se excessive. The Court focuses primarily on the
fact that the fifth extension was frivolous because it was granted to enable
further investigation of the criminal activities of other persons having nothing in common with the complainant. Moreover, the Court hastened to
point out that the issue of the complainant's guilt was controversial and that
38
his health was failing. '
5.

The Right to Compensation

Polish law as a matter of general rule provides for liability of the treas38 2
ury for torts committed by state officers acting in their official capacity.
More specific rules, which govern liability of the state for damages resulting
from "ill-founded conviction" and "obviously ill-founded preliminary detention," are included in the CCP and preempt application of the Civil
Code. 38 3 The fundamental premise of the state's liability is "obvious illfoundedness" of the preliminary detention. It is clear from various judicial
and scholarly pronouncements that the standard to be applied is the Polish
law on preliminary detention operative at the time when the decision to
detain was made. Mere unlawfulness of the decision to detain under the
Polish law is not a sufficient ground for the action. The unlawfulness (or
"ill-foundedness") must be shown to have been "obvious." To meet the
standard, a petitioner has to show at least two things: 38 4 (1) the decision to
detain him was a flagrant and substantial violation of law, not a trivial or
technical one; and (2) the unlawfulness should have been obvious to the
379. Kaftal, Konirolasadu nad tymczasowym aresztowanzem w swetle orzecznictwa SN, supra note
134, at 99. For a similar pattern of decision-making by the Provincial Court in Kielce, see id. at
99.
380. (1975) OSNIKiW, No. 3-4, Item 45.
381. Id. at 66.
382. The Civil Code, Law of April 23, 1964, J.L. No. 16, Item 93 as amended, arts. 417-420.
383. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 487.
384. The burden of proof rests upon a petitioner. Mazur, supra note 348, at 779.
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3
procurator or the court at the time the decision to detain was made.

85

Therefore, the ultimate acquittal of the petitioner or the decision to
drop the charges are not dispositive since they may result from legal insufficiency of evidence apparent at the time of disposition but not at all apparent
at the time of detention. 386 Obvious ill-foundedness of preliminary detention, as the Supreme Court recently indicated, may be found in particular in
cases where there was never probable cause for the charging. decision, where
the proceedings were legally impermissible (e.g., the statute of limitation
lapsed), or where one of the "grounds" for detention was lacking. 38 7 The
compensation should cover material as well as "moral" loss, such as physical
388
and moral sufferings and humiliation.
The proceedings for compensation for "unfounded conviction" and
"obviously unfounded preliminary detention" are governed by special rules
of criminal procedure.
The provincial court has jurisdiction and decides after a hearing before
a panel composed of three professional judges. Participation of counsel for
the petitioner and a procurator is mandatory.
Decisions of a provincial court are reviewable by the Supreme Court
upon a complaint by either party.
Damages resulting from unlawful arrest or detention by the police as
well as other kinds of unlawful detention by state officers or agents are also
actionable against the treasury. Such actions, however, are governed by the
rules of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure.
6.

Noncriminal Detention

Polish law allows for detention in a variety of situations unrelated to
criminal liability. Without trying to be exhaustive, we will focus briefly on
the two kinds of noncriminal detention which are of considerable practical
significance.
A great variety of noncriminal, petty offenses are within the jurisdiction
of nonjudicial agencies. The agencies, called Collegia for the Cases of Petty
Offenses, are theoretically composed of laymen and, in practice, function as
administrative organs. The procedure they apply is administrative in na38 9
ture.
Petty offenses are punishable by imprisonment of up to three months,
385. Decision of the Supreme Court, June 7, 1975 OSNIKiW No. 8, Item 114; Mazur, supra
note 348, at 775; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 313.

386. See Decision of the Supreme Court, June 7, 1975, supra note 385; Decision of the
Supreme Court, Jan. 7, 1977 OSNIKiW, No. 4-5, Item 47; Mazur, supra note 348, at 775. For a
contrary opinion, that a defendant who was ultimately acquitted is, as a matter of course, entitled to a compensation for "obviously ill-founded detention," see Waszczynski, Odszkodowanie za
uesluszne skazanzie i aresztowanie, 1974 Palestra, No. 11, 103, 108.

387. Decision of the Supreme Court, Jan. 7, 1977 OSNIKiW, No. 4-5, Item 47.
388. Mazur, supra note 348, at 772; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 313; Waszczynski,
supra note 386, at 109.
389. The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses, supra note 69; S. WALTOS, supra note
108, at 302-303; Olszewski, Kontrola sadowa had orzecznictwem w sprawach o wykroczenia---de lege

ferenda, (1976) PANSTWO I PRAwo (No. 1-2; 191).
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limitation of freedom of up to three months, fines up to 5,000 zlotys, or censure, and some "additional penalties" such as suspension of driving privi-

leges.

39

0

The penalties of limitation of freedom or fine, in cases of their nonexactability, may be replaced by imprisonment; therefore, the law on petty
offenses provides for two kinds of imprisonment: imprisonment as a "princi' 391
pal punishment" and imprisonment as a "substitute punishment.
Decisions of a collegium of the trial level are reviewable by a collegium
of the higher order upon appeal by either party. Decisions imposing imprisonment as a principal punishment or limitation of freedom may be protested
to a regional court. 392 The court hears the case de novo, applying a simplified procedure. 393 The court may increase the sentence imposed by the collegium. 394 The court's decision is not subject to any direct review by an
appellate court.3 95 Imprisonment imposed by a collegium in lieu of fine is
therefore beyond judicial control of any kind.39 6 Imprisonment of this kind
has been quite widely applied in the past. In 1971, for example, a total of
21,690 persons served sentences of imprisonment for petty offenses. That
included only 6,945 cases of imprisonment as a principal punishment and
14,745 cases of imprisonment as a substitute punishment. 39 7 Polish writers
have been almost unanimously critical of the law which vests extensive
power to imprison exclusively with administrative agencies and removes
398
their decisions from judicial review.
The second major kind of noncriminal detention is commitment of the
mentally ill (civil commitment). This highly complex and sensitive area has
not been dealt with by the Polish legislature. Until recently all draft legislation died before being implemented. At present, the power of detention and
compulsory treatment of the mentally ill still resides with the medical personnel of psychiatric institutions. 399 Draft legislation now under consideration, however, would allow the physician to commit a patient involuntarily
but would require the need for commitment to be confirmed by the guardi4°°
anship court.
390. The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses, supra note 69, at arts. 1, 18, 28.
391. Id. at arts. 23, 25.
392. Id. at art. 86.
393. See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 455-461. For a further discussion, see S. WALTOS, supra
note 108, at 301-336.
394. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 460; S. WALTOS, supra note 108, at 334.
395. See CCP, upra note 67, at art. 461.
396. S. WALTOS, supra note 108, at 312, 325; J. SKUPINSKI, MODEL POLSKIEGA PRAWA 0
WYKROCZENIACH 332 (1974).
397. J. SKUPINSKI, supra note 396, at 333.
398. Olszewski, supra note 389, at 194; J. SKUPINSKI, supra note 396, at 333; S. WALTOS,
supra note 108, at 312.
399. Pomorski, Problenatyka leczeniaprzmusowego n a Ileprojeklu uslay o ochronie zdrowia pychic
nego z 1970, 1972 PANSTWO i PRAwo (No. 3) 46, 50.
400. Daszkiewicz, Dabrowski & Kubicki, Prawna regulaqa ochronv z6drowia piyehiengo, 1974
PANSTWO I PRAWO (No. 8-9) 70.
The director of the admitting facility is required to notify the Guardianship Court
within 48 hours of the patient's involuntary admission and the Court, in turn, is required to hear the matter without cost to the patient within 14 days of such notification. Whether or not the patient is to be civilly committed is determined by a judge
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D.

Compatibility of Polish law with Article 9 of the Covenant

In the present section we will limit our discussion to those features of
Polish law which either are clearly incompatible with article 9 of the Covenant or whose compatibility with this article is at least open to challenge.
A general power of the police to arrest and to detain a suspected person
up to forty-eight hours without a warrant is of questionable validity. 4° t As
noted above, the absence of any requirement that the police inform a suspected person at the time of arrest of the reasons for his arrest is a clear
violation of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. These shortcomings of
the Polish law on the police power to arrest have become recently even more
conspicuous. Reportedly, the police have been abusing the broad powers
granted by law to harass political dissidents. A large number of persons politically "suspect" have been recently arrested (some of these many times),
without grounds and without any explanations, and subsequently released
within forty-eight hours. Apparently, criminal charges against these people
4
have never been prosecuted. 02
There is a serious question as to whether the rights of the defendant
provided for by article 9, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, have been implemented adequately by Polish municipal law.
First of all, serious doubts arise in regard to the right of the defendant to
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer "authorized by law to
exercise judicial power." Whether the rule of Polish law that the arrestee
must be produced before the procurator within forty-eight hours of his arrest
satisfies the requirement of "promptness" is an issue per se, but not the primary one. Of more essential concern is the issue whether the procurator
before whom an arrestee is produced has the qualities of a judicial officer.
Under Polish law, the procurator's responsibilities and powers certainly
reach beyond the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses. The
procurator is expected to be a guardian and an advocate of legality and as
such is supposed to be fair and objective. Some of.his functions resemble
those of an ombudsman in Scandinavian countries. The procuratorial offices are structured as a separate, hierarchically organized system, independent from the agencies of state administration. The chief officer of the system,
40 3
Nevthe Procurator General, reports directly to the Council of the State.
ertheless, the primary and by far the most important institutional function of
4 4
the officers of the procuracy is investigation and prosecution of crimes. 0 It
is rather obvious that the role of the prosecutor is totally incompatible with
and two assessors (citizen-magistrates) after the patient and two expert witnesses, both
psychiatrists, have been heard.
Dabrowski, Major Issues in the Polish Mental Health Legislation Draft Proposal, 1 INT'L J. OF L. &

PsYcH. 125, 132 (1978).
401. See Study on Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest, supra note 214.

402. See letter signed by A. Steinsberg on behalf of the Committee for the Defense of Workers to Amnesty International (June 7, 1978), reprintedin 1978 Kultura (Paris), No. 7-8; 237-38.
Numerous instances of abusive uses of police power to arrest have been reported in RAINA,
POLrrICAL OPPosrrIoN IN POLAND, (1954-1977) 361 (1978).

403. Law of April 14, 1967 on The Procuracy of the Polish People's Republic, J.L. 1967, No.
13, Item 55, arts. 1-5.

404. Id.at art. 31.
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the role of a judicial officer, for the simple reason that the prosecutor is institutionally interested in the outcome of the case. Polish law gives unequivo4 5
cal recognition to this fact, disqualifying procurators from adjudication. 0
Secondly, Polish law does not afford procurators the kind of independence enjoyed by judges. To the contrary, all officers of the procuracy are
members of a bureaucratic hierarchy and must carry out orders from their
superiors. 40 6 The principle of hierarchical subordination has been strongly
emphasized in Polish literature as a fundamental organizational feature of
procuracy and as sharply contrasting with the principle of judicial indepen4 7
dence. 0
On the other hand, the purpose of article 9, paragraph 3 of the Covenant seems to be clear. The power to decide whether to release or to detain
an arrestee should be vested in an impartial state officer, one neither interested in the outcome of the case nor dependent on prosecuting authorities;
the officer should have substantial job security, free from pressures "from
above." Serious doubts exist whether Polish procurators meet these standards.
As noted above, 4° 8 the right of the detainee to be tried within "a reasonable time" or released is a separate and independent right provided for by
article 9, paragraph 3. Compatibility of Polish law with this requirement of
the Covenant is not entirely clear. Certainly, the notion of "reasonable
time" is susceptible to many interpretations, and to a large extent its meaning depends upon the facts of an individual case. Nevertheless, certain features of Polish law, as well as certain practices of Polish courts, seem to be of
questionable validity.
The Code of Criminal Procedure seems very generous to the prosecution. A suspect may be detained, even by a prosecutor of low rank, for a
period of up to three months. Already this initial period of detention greatly
exceeds the maximum duration suggested by the Draft Principles. 40 9 But
the duration of the detention may be, and often is, even longer. The provincial procuracy has the power to extend detention up to six months, and a
provincial court may extend it indefinitely if the interest of the investigation
so requires. In one case, the provincial court granted many extensions
amounting, cumulatively, to a period of two-and-a-half years. Moreover,
the Supreme Court did not find such a period of detention excessive per
se. 4 10 In addition, preliminary detention may be continued after the investigation is closed and formal charges filed with a court, again for an indefinite
time and without any explicit decision to this effect.
Whether ex parte proceedings before a court, in which a prisoner may
challenge the lawfulness of his detention, 4 11 satisfies the standards of article
9, paragraph 4 remains an open question. Given the nature of the proceed405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 30, § 5.
Law on the Procuracy of the Polish People's Republic, supra note 403, art. 5, § 1.
Smolenski, supra note 139, at 28.
See notes 232-46 supra and accompanying text.
See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 380-81 supra and accompanying text.
See note 378 supra and accompanying text.
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ings, especially its ex parte character (with only a procurator participating),
its secrecy, and its lack of opportunity for the prisoner or his counsel to be
heard, it is arguable that the standards of the Covenant have not been met.
The instances of imprisonment imposed by administrative agencies for
noncriminal offenses which are removed from judicial review represent a
clear violation of article 9, paragraph 4.412
B.

Right to Appeal
1.

Interpretation of Article 14, Paragraph 5 of the Covenant

Very little interpretive work has been done on the Covenant as a
whole. 4 13 This is particularly true of article 14, paragraph 5 due, in part, to
its content 41 4 and to its legislative history. 415 Nevertheless, an interpretive
framework may be established by examining the history and the travaux
preparatoires.
Article 14, paragraph 5 of the Covenant reads: "Evegone convicted of a
crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher
tribunalaccording to law." Article 14, as originally submitted by the Commis4 16
sion on Human Rights, included no mention of the right to appeal.
The purpose of article 14, as expressed by the Third Committee of the
General Assembly which added paragraph 5, was to proclaim and guarantee
the fundamental right of everyone to be judged fairly by providing the mini41 7
mum code of criminal procedure which should be applied universally.
While proposing an amendment to article 14 to include paragraph 5, the
Israeli delegate felt that "there could be no justice in criminal law unless
everyone's right to appeal to a higher court for review of judgments were
[sic] recognized. Only a higher court could decide whether a trial had been
conducted in accordance with the principles formulated in article 14. ' '418
412. Olszewski, supra note 389, at 193.
413. See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
414. The right to appeal does not constitute as fundamental a human right as, for example,
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention covered by art. 9. Commentators have
not dealt with nor has there been any subsequent United Nations study on the subject matter.
There is no possibility of utilizing the European Convention as an interpretive tool since it does
not provide for the right to appeal in criminal cases. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLEcrED TExTS, art. 6 at 4 (7th ed. 1971).
The notion that the defendant's right to appeal his conviction and sentence is an essential
ingredient of due process originates in continental European legal ideology. Strong appellate
mechanisms have been characteristic of legal systems emphasizing the value of uniformity and
predictability, systems adhering to a centralized authority structure. In the common-law world,
in contrast, the appellate mechanism has traditionally been weak. Many decisions at the trial
level have remained immune from appellate review. For a further discussion, see Damaska,
Strttures of Authority and Comparative CrimiatlProcedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975).
415. See notes 416-34 infra and accompanying text.
416. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 Annexes (Agenda Item 34) 1, at 9, U.N. Doe. A/4299 (1959).
417. See 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 259, at 260, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.961 (1959); 14
U.N. GAOR, C.3 (963d mtg.) 267, at 269, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.963 (1959); 14 U.N. GAOR,
C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 272, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959); 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (965th
mtg.) 275, at 276, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.965 (1959).
418. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 259, at 260, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.961 (1959).
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420
4 19
and
was adopted by the Committee,
The new paragraph, as amended,
42
1
Covenant.
the
became part of the final text of

The discussion preceding the adoption of the new paragraph is enlight' 4 22
ening. The original text of paragraph 5 used the term "right to appeal,
which raised doubts in some delegations 423 as to whether it meant merely a
review of the case by another court or whether new evidence had to be admitted. 424 In changing the wording to the present text, the Israeli delegate
stated that his intention was to provide for some form of appeal, and because
different legal systems made different provisions for appeal, he did not want
425
The Ceylonese subamendto specify how the appeal should be shaped.
4 26
to the new paragraph added the phrase "according to law" at the
ment
end of the proposed text so that due regard would be paid to the conditions
to which the right of appeal was generally made subject, to prevent
abuses. 427 Throughout the discussions it was emphasized that the provision
was drafted in general terms to be applied by the states according to the
methods they considered appropriate. 428 Yet, delegates reiterated the fact
that article 14, paragraph 5 recognizes the essential principle that as a gen4 29
and
eral rule any person convicted of a crime has the right of appeal
although this might conflict with national laws, the provision is needed pre4 30
Finally,
cisely so that states should bring their legislation into line with it.
not encompass
the exceptions covered by the phrase "according to law"43 may
1
those which would render the paragraph meaningless.
The positioning of the right to appeal in article 14 of the Covenant
leads to further general propositions about its construction. Article 14 as a
whole sets forth the right to a fair trial, an important element of which is the
right to appeal.4 32 Conversely, the guarantees provided for in article 14,
(such as the equality before the courts/tribunals, the right to an independent, competent and impartial court, and the right to defense) apply not only
to proceedings before the trial court, but also to appellate proceedings. Even
though the European Convention does not have a provision analogous to
paragraph 5, the European Court of Human Rights, in construing article 6
of the Convention, held that a state which does institute courts of appeal is
required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these
419.

14 U.N. GAOR, C.3. Annexes (Agenda Item 34) 1, at 2, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/L.795/Rev.

2 (1959).
420. Id. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.833.
421. I. at 15.
422. Id. at 1, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/L.795/Rev. 1.
423. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (962d mtg.) 263, at 265, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.962 (1959).
424. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 259, at 261, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.961 (1959).
425. Id.
426. See note 204 supra.
427. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 272, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959).
428. Id. at 273-74; 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 Annexes (Agenda Item 34) 1, at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/4299 (1959).
429. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 274, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959).
430. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (966th mtg.) 279, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.966 (1959).
431. Id.at 280.
432. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Pohital Rghts and theEuropean Conventionon Human Rghts, 43 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 21, 33 (1969).
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courts the fundamental rights guaranteed under article

6.

433

It may be argued, therefore, that certain fundamental safeguards of a
review procedure by "a higher tribunal" are inferrable from the text of article 14, in particular from paragraphs 1 through 3. All defendants should be
equal before the review tribunals, and they shall be entitled to "a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law." The right to an effective defense should extend to appellate
proceedings as well.
A more difficult issue is the scope of appellate review required by article
14, paragraph 5. From the legislative history of the provision (outlined
above) it follows that the draftsmen wanted to write a flexible formula; one
which would accomodate the variety of solutions offered by municipal laws.
One should keep in mind that the several systems providing for appellate
review in criminal cases offer a great variety of solutions to the questions of
the grounds for review, the scope of review, and the powers of the reviewing
court. It follows from the plain meaning of paragraph 5 that the municipal
legal systems have to provide for a review by a higher tribunal of both conviction and sentence on the appeal by the defendant. Therefore, by necessary implication, any legal system which provides only for a review of the
convictions but not the sentence or, conversely, provides only for a review of
the sentence but not the conviction fails the test. That much, but only that
much, seems to be clear. Beyond that, many questions arise to which text of
paragraph 5 does not suggest any ready answers.
May the review of conviction be limited to "the points of law" to the
total exclusion of "the issues of fact"? May, for example, a municipal legal
system bar a review on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the
theory that this is a "factual issue"? Such an arrangement seems to be of
doubtful validity since it would leave the presumption of innocence, included in article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant as one of the due process
requirements, without an effective remedy. While construing the meaning of
paragraph 5, one should keep in mind that its purpose is to establish some
safeguards so that criminal defendants are not wrongfully condemned to
43 4
years of suffering.
May the review tribunal reverse a judgment of acquittal on appeal by
the prosecution and convict the defendant without a further possibility of
review, or may it, under similar circumstances, reverse a judgment of conviction and convict a defendant for a more serious crime? May the reviewing
tribunal increase the sentence on appeal by the prosecution without a further possibility of review? May the reviewing tribunal make such decisions
on the ground of independent fact finding? While seeking answers to the
above questions one should proceed from the notion of "review by a higher
tribunal." The essence of review seems to be checking whether a court
which made a decision on the merits committed any legally relevant errors.
Therefore, the defendant, under paragraph 5, is entitled to have his guilt
and his sentence decided by one court and these decisions checked by an433.

F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 84-85 (1975).

434.

14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 274, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959).
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other court. The court of the first level "finds facts" and applies substantive
law. It addresses the issues of liability and punishment. The reviewing court
approaches the case from another perspective-whether the decisions of the
lower court have been made lege ar/is. Under this analysis all three questions
raised above must be answered in the negative, since the questions imply
one-level decision-making on the merits without checking its correctness.
The negative answers seem to be particularly compelling when the higher
tribunal makes its own fact-finding.
May the right to have one's sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal be
limited to challenging its legality, or does it necessarily include the right to
appeal on the merits, i.e., to a review of the severity of the sentence as well as
its legality? Limiting appellate review of sentences to the question of mere
legality to the exclusion of the review of their severity is of suspicious validity. First, it seems to fly in the face of the plain meaning of paragraph 5.
"Review of the sentence" means primarily a review of its severity. This
meaning should prevail unless a different, special meaning is discernible.
Second, the thrust of article 14 in general and of paragraph 5 in particular is
to ensure the fair outcome of criminal proceedings. The exclusion of the
most essential part of the decision from appellate review seems unreasonable
and to a large extent thwarts the purpose of the provision.
Finally, may appellate review initiated by the defendant only (ie., without a parallel appeal by the prosecution or a third party such as the victim)
lead to a change of the decision below in a way detrimental to the defendant? In other words, is the prohibition of reformatio in pezus, a principle almost universally recognized by the civil law systems, implied by article 14,
paragraph 5? It is arguable that the very possibility of reformatio in peius has
such a chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal by the defendant that it amounts to a denial of the right to appeal.
With the above tentative suggestions concerning the possible meaning
of article 14 paragraph 5 of the Covenant, the next topic is a review of American and Polish municipal laws.
2.

American Law

Appellate review of criminal convictions is not a right guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States. 435 In the federal system, appellate
jurisdiction is statutory and Congress may withhold the privilege entirely in
criminal cases. Currently, a court of appeals will not review a criminal conviction unless the appellant can allege some error of law; to attain review by
the Supreme Court, the defendant must show that the error involved an
436
issue of grave or constitutional importance.
All American states provide constitutional or statutory provisions for
defendant-initiated appellate review of errors committed in criminal
435. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88
(1894).
436. Adams, The "Right" to Appeal in the U.S.: Elusive or I//usoq, 3 OHio N.U.I. REV. 345,
347 (1975).
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cases. 4 3 7 However, the state may either grant or deny review in a criminal
case and, absent the presence of a federal constitutional right, the legislature
may deny review. 438 Some statutes provide for an absolute right of appeal
as a continuation of the original suit; others make issuance of a writ of error
discretionary and an independent action in the nature of a new original
suit. 439 Functionally, the distinction between "discretionary" appeal and an
44 °
appeal "of right" has been eroded in modern practice.
Although Louisiana is the only jurisdiction in the United States that
44
seems to lack appellate review of conviction for some significant crimes, '
limitations on defendants' appeals exist in other jurisdictions. For example,
442
some states refuse appeal to a convicted defendant who is on probation.
443
ReFurther, a guilty plea has traditionally precluded appellate review.
cently, however, there has been an effort to remove such obstacles, and now
only a few states statutorily preclude an appeal from a conviction based on a
44 4
guilty plea.
The general rule in the United States, that the reviewing court's function is limited only to the determination of questions of law is applicable in
criminal cases. 445 On appeal from a conviction, the issue for the appellate
court to review is whether the defendant was subjected to prejudicial error. 4 46 Since relitigation of factual issues is not usually permitted on appellate review, 4 4 7 the present position of American appellate courts is that if the
evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, and if the jury was properly
instructed, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. 448 When reviewing
cases tried by a judge alone, appellate courts will ordinarily limit their review to inferences and judgments made by the trial court. 449 American appellate courts must, however, deal with questions of fact when reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a judgment. 4 50 This is because an error of
437. See, e.g., State v. Stunkard, 28 S.D. 311, 133 N.W. 253 (1911).
438. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
439. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 94 Fla. 322, 113 So. 630 (1927).
440.
(1973).

D.

MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS; ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS

441. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (approved draft) 17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA CRIMINAL
APPEALS STANDARDS].

Appeals from convictions of misdemeanors may be entertained by the state Supreme Court
only if the defendant is fined $500 or sentenced to more than six months in jail. LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC., Art. 312.1.
The Louisiana court of appeals has no jurisdiction over criminal appeals so it appears that
the conviction of a misdemeanent receiving a sentence of six months or less or a fine lower than
$500 is unreviewable. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441.
442. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441, at 29.
443. See, e.g., Lowe v. State, Ill Md. 1, 73 A. 637 (1909).
444. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS supra note 441, at 23.
445. See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 136 So. 2d 352 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
446. See, e.g., Legg v. Los Angeles County, Dep't of Charities, 175 Cal. App. 2d 637, 346
P.2d 472 (1959).
447. Bator, Finality in Cnmrinal Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 441, 453-54 (1963).
448. D. MEADOR, supra note 440, at 89, 90.
449. D. KERLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 16 (1963).
See, e.g., Muller v. Nelson, Sherrod & Carter, 563 S.W.2d 697 (rex. Civ. App. 1978).
450. D. KERLEN, supra note 449, at 34.
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law is always committed when the great weight of evidence is against the
verdict. 45 ' Hence, state and federal appellate courts do re-determine the
merits of legal issues and thus help to satisfy the search for correctness which
452
no single court, unchecked, can provide.
The prevailing system of criminal appeals in America is based on the
premise that appellate review of a judgment of conviction is not required in
every case.4 53 Review is initiated by the defendant, and, although recently
there has been increasing support for a system of automatic review, this concept has not been accepted. 454 Article 14, paragraph 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the premise that appellate review of a criminal
conviction is a basic human right. The underlying spirit and rationale of the
provision 4 55 would be enhanced if review were automatic, thus insuring all
defendants the protection of having their convictions reviewed. However, it
perhaps goes too far to say that automatic review is compelled by the construction of article 14, paragraph 5.
The availability of appellate review of criminal convictions in all American jurisdictions is in accord with the mandate of the Covenant. Although
the scope of review is limited by the requirement that defendant must allege
error and by the limitation on review of the facts, the American system seems
to assure that an appellate court will have the opportunity to decide whether
the trial was conducted in accordance with the principles formulated in article 14.456
Finally, a strict interpretation of what is required to constitute a review
of conviction would be unwarranted. The drafters raised issues of whether
an appeal after a guilty plea, or the taking of new evidence were necessary
and decided that the intent was not to specify how appeals should be made
457
but only that they are available.
A second guarantee in article 14 provides that anyone convicted of a
crime has the right to have his sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.
"[A]n irony of the American criminal justice system [is] that while every
jurisdiction allows a defendant to appeal a conviction on a wide variety of
grounds, a sentence which falls within the prescribed statutory range cannot
be appealed in the federal courts and in most states. ' ' 45 8 Traditionally, appellate courts in America have reviewed illegal sentences, those alleged to be
451. L.

ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 80

(1939).

Review of the facts would actually entail reviewing the credibility of the witnesses, accepting new testimony, calling new witnesses and, in its broadest sense, retrial of the case. None
of these things are reviewable under the present system when verdicts are set aside as contrary to
the weight of evidence. Id. at 82.
452. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441, at 23.
453. Id. at 19.
454. Id.
455. See note 467 supra and accompanying text.
456. See notes 418-19 supra and accompanying text.
457. U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 261; U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.961, par.24 (1959).
458. Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences; Penology on the Judicial Doorstep 68 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 122 (1977). But see ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (approved
at 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS].

draft) commentary

1980]

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAkW

outside the boundaries set by the Constitution. 459 Presently, an illegal sentence is subject to review and correction through the normal appellate process even in those jurisdictions which do not ordinarily afford review of
46
sentences. 0
An appellant may also seek review of a sentence which, though legal, is
excessive. 46 1 In the absence of a specific statutory grant of power, an appellate court generally will not reduce a sentence within the statutory limits
462
Although the imposimerely because in its view the sentence is excessive.
of
tion of a sentence is a critical stage in a criminal case, in most jurisdictions
463
the United States this decision is not subject to appellate review.
Although recent surveys differ, 4 6 4 the latest survey (1977) indicates that
4 65
some form of sentence review is available in at least twenty-three states.
Eighteen states base the power to review sentences on explicit statutory authority, eight within the context of a general grant of appellate power, the
others in statutes addressing themselves elaborately and sometimes exclusively to the subject of sentence review. 466 The five remaining states review
sentences on appeal through application of a general jurisdictional statute. 4 6 7 Some statutes limit reviewable sentences on the basis of their length
and type (more than two years; committment to the state prison), others on
the basis of the type of proceeding for determining guilt (defendant must
have pleaded guilty; sentence imposed by jury not reviewable) and some on
468
If the states in
the basis of the general authority of the reviewing court.
it
appears that
considered,
are
not
limited
severely
is
review
sentence
which
and in only
states,
only
seventeen
in
the remedy of sentence review obtains
and onas
a
real
practiced
of
sentences
review
ten of those states is appellate
46 9
going remedy offering reasonable chances of success.
In the states which severely restrict or do not recognize sentence review
and in the federal courts, a sentence which falls within the range of punishment provided by statute is final. 4 70 Federal courts have no authority to
review sentences they regard as excessive but which are within statutory limits;47I however, certain review techniques have been initiated by the circuit
472
Sentences are recourts of appeal and accepted by the Supreme Court.
459. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
460. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441, at 23.
461.

L. ORFIELD, supra note 451, at 101.

462. Id.
463. Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing, 33 LA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1973).
464. See Mueller, Penology on Appeal- Appellate Review ofLegal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND.
L. REV. 671 (1962); Comment, CriminalSentencizg. Is the Judge'sSound DiscretionSubject to Review?
1959 JUDICATURE 112 (1975); Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 221

(1972).
465. Labbe, supra note 458, at 123.
466. Id. at 123, 126.
467. Id. at 126.
468. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458 at 2. See also Smithburn, Sentencing in Indiana: Appellate Review of the Trial Court Discretion, 12 VAL. U.L.R. 219, 225 (1978).
469. Labbe, supra note 458, at 127.
470. Id. at 123.
471. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
472. See Blake, Appellate Review of CrininalSentenctg in the Federal Courts, 24 KAN. L. REV.
279 (1976).
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viewed for abuse of discretion, insufficient individualization of disposition,
adherence to fixed or mechanical sentencing policy, and failure to exercise
4 73
discretion.
The number of states which have developed an excessive sentence review doctrine similar to the one implemented at the federal level is undetermined. Observers have noted, however, that in the absence of power to
review a sentence, the appellate court will strain the law if it is convinced
that a penalty is grossly excessive. 4 74 In addition, appellate courts in many
jurisdictions have the power to pass on the manner in which a sentence is
imposed, even without a provision for review of the propriety of the sentence
itself.4 75
The general rule in American jurisdictions, limiting appellate review of
sentence to questions of legality while refraining from examining the severity
of the sentence, is of doubtful validity under article 14, paragraph 5. Because the intent of the Covenant is to assure that each stage of the dispostion
of a criminal case may be reviewed, review should not be limited to the
process by which the sentence was chosen. The merits of the sentence must
be open to examination. The provision mandates that the sentence be
checked, that this crucial decision not be left to one tribunal. This is especially important in jurisdictions, as are found in the United States, in which
the length of a sentence legally imposed for a given crime may vary from
months to decades. 4 76 To limit the right of appellate review of sentences to
mere legality and to prohibit any appellate consideration of the severity of
the sentence is to render the guarantees contained in article 14, paragraph 5
4 77
meaningless.
To what extent may appeal of a conviction or sentence be detrimental
to a defendant in the United States? Traditionally, the general rule precluded the prosecution from appealing a judgment in favor of the defendant
in a criminal case. 478 Exceptions to this rule, based on statutes, pertained to
certain pretrial motions dismissing the case. No appeal by the state from a
judgment of not guilty was permitted. 479 Today, jurisdictions differ considerably. Some bar appeal by the state in criminal cases while others take a
4 a°
broad position on prosecutorial appeals.
The prosecution can appeal after the jury finds the defendant not guilty
41
under some provisions, while this possibility is excluded under others.
473.
474.

Id. at 281.
Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentenang, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 257 (1952).

"[Tihere is probably more appellate review than appears on the surface where courts reverse on
what would otherwise be dismissed as harmless error because the record shows extreme severity
or prejudice in sentencing." Id. at 264.
475. Note, Appellate Review of Sentenchg Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
476. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458.
477. See note 434 supra and accompanying text.
478. United States v. Weissman, 266 U.S. 377 (1924).
479. In Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 344-45 (1954), the Court referred to "the deeply
rooted principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable while a verdict of acquittal
is not."
480. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458, at 35; Note, Limited Right of
Appealfar the State, 14 Hous. L. REv. 735, 737 (1977).
481. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 335-41.
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Some states permit appeals in very narrow circumstances, such as when a
statute is held unconstitutional, but most states have broader authority for
prosecutorial appeals on pretrial orders.48 2 Only a handful of states allow
the prosecution to appeal a verdict favorable to the defendant on admission
of evidence, privilege, instructions to the jury or other trial questions; however, a substantial number of states permit such appeal from orders granting
48 3
To avoid double
defense motions to arrest judgment or for a new trial.
jeopardy, some states authorize prosecutorial appeals in broad circumstances
but provide that the defendant shall not be affected by the outcome of the
4
appeal . 84
The Criminal Appeals Act was amended by Congress in 1970 to extend
the power of a federal prosecutor to appeal in criminal cases to the limits
48 5
As deallowed by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
fined by the Supreme Court, these powers include a prosecutorial appeal
from a termination in favor of the defendant when there has been a finding
of guilt which can be reinstated and appeal from terminations in favor of the
defendant that occured prior to impanelment of a jury or before the court
jury acquittals
began to hear evidence in a bench trial. Appeal is barred 4by
86
and determinations of factual innocence by a trial judge.
In the United States, a defendant, after a successful appeal, may receive
a more severe sentence upon re-prosecution. Federal and state courts have
barred prior results in cases where constitutional questions are raised when48 a7
heavier sentence is imposed after the initial conviction is upset on appeal.
The American Bar Association's standards provide that, in accordance with
the prohibition against reformatio in pezus, a fundamental precept of criminal
law in civil law countries, the original sentence should serve as a maximum
and the defendant should receive credit for any time served on the new sen488
tence.
The United States Supreme Court has not resolved this question. In
1969 the Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce that a criminal defendant who
had successfully appealed his original conviction could not receive a more
severe sentence on reconviction unless the increase was due to the defend48 9
Although there is no
ant's conduct subsequent to his original conviction.
absolute constitutional bar to an increased sentence on retrial, the Court
concluded that due process precluded penalizing a defendant for having suc49
cessfully attacked his original conviction. 0 However, in 1972 in Cotten V.
Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant who had exercised his absolute right to a trial in a superior court following conviction in a
482. 2 B. GEORGE, CRIMINAL PROSECUTOR'S SOURCEBOOK 1331 (1976).
483. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 350.
484. Id. at 38.
485. Luckey, DoubleJeopardyLznitations on Appeals by the Gvenment in CriminalCases, 80 DICK.
L. REV. 525 (1976).
486. Id. at 546.
487. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS supra note 458, at 58.
488. Id. at 50489. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
490. Id. at 725, 726. See Note, Criminal Law-IncreasedSentences on an Appeal B Right From
Infernor Courts, 51 N. CAR. L. REV. 882 (1973).
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lower court could receive a more severe sentence upon reconviction in a
court of general jurisdiction.4 9 '
The problem of a defendant receiving an increased sentence on appeal
is also present when he seeks review of his sentence. Among those states
which allow review of sentences, the original sentence can be increased on
appeal in eight states if the court finds that the original sentence was too
lenient. 492 Only one state, Alaska, permits the prosecutor to appeal to have
a sentence declared deficient. Two federal statutes allow increases of
sentences on appeal at the instance of the government. 493 One state allows a
sentence to be increased only upon the introduction of new evidence of ag4 94
gravation.
Several recent proposals concerning appellate review of sentences would
provide for such an increase. 495 The federal statute implementing appellate
review of sentences in the federal courts, which did not pass both houses,
contained such a provision as did a proposal by the Council of State Governments. 496 Moreover, the proposed Act to reform federal criminal law recently passed by the Senate, allows the government to appeal criminal cases
to obtain a more severe sentence. 49 7 Since the government may appeal independently of the defendant, his decision to appeal need not consider possible
government action. 498 The Act precludes an increase of sentence if only the
499
defendant appeals.
However, it does enable the appellate court to impose a quota or lesser
sentence without remand, which means that the new sentence will not be
5° °
reviewed unless certoriari is granted.
The intent of article 14, paragraph 5 is undermined by the type of practices now in force which made a defendant's appeal detrimental to him. The
fundamental right to review truly exists only where it may be exercised without fear that the prisoner's position will be worsened. The chilling effect of
reformatto i'n
pezius makes much of the American practice incompatible with
the Covenant. In addition, it is basic to article 14, paragraph 5 that any
fundamental change in the disposition of the defendant must be subject to
review. Therefore, it is unacceptable for the reviewing court to increase the
sentence without remanding the case to a lower court from which the defendant may appeal.
Finally, a brief note must be made of other remedies available to a defendant in the United States which provide some of the protection sought in
491. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
492. Dansky, The Constitutionalityof IncreasingSentences on Appellate Remitw, 69 J. CRIM. L. 19,

20 (1978).
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458, at 1-2.
496. Id.
497. S. 1437, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. § 3725 (1978).
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. The proposals to allow government appeals of sentences are controversial, and their
constitutionality is disputed. See Spencer, The Federal Cnminal Code Reform Act of 1977 and
ProsecutonalAppeal of Sentences. Justice of DoubleJeopardy, 37 MD. L. REV. 739, 778 (1978).
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article 14 paragraph 5. Although direct appeal of conviction and sentence is
preferrable and is demanded by the Covenant, post-conviction remedies exist that may be invoked after the final appeal from conviction has been de50 1
The
cided or after the prescribed time for taking an appeal has passed.
considerable number and variety of post-conviction remedies found in
American jurisdictions duplicate and overlap with one another. Therefore
there is uncertainty as to the scope and purpose of each. Combinations of
50 2
such remedies exist, however, or are thought to exist, in most jurisdictions.
The principle remedies are common law or statutory writs of habeas corpus,
common law or statutory writs of error, motion to set aside or correct a sentence, motions to withdraw a plea of guilty, and petitions for leave to take an
appeal (or to reopen an appeal). 50 3 However, the inadequacy of most state
systems of post conviction review has led to the need for federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners.
There are some serious limitations for the defendant in the post-conviction remedies currently available. The present practice is to favor the assignment of applications for post-conviction relief to the same judge who
presided at the original trial. 50 4 Present systems tend to create an elaborate
overlay of procedural rules in an attempt to dispose of post-conviction peti50 5
Finally,
tions rather than treating them and their underlying merits.
renewal
procedure,
post-conviction
aside
in
a
been
set
when a judgment has
of prosecution of the charges is not foreclosed and a new conviction may
follow. 50 6 In the United States, defendant may be given a harsher sentence
on re-conviction or re-sentence than was originally imposed, either by an
outright increase in the sentence or by denial of credit for time served under
the prior, invalid sentence. 50 7 Given these limitations, current post-conviction remedies do not provide the type of review envisioned by article 14,
paragraph 5 of the Covenant.
3.

Polish Law

Current Polish law 50 8 provides for a review of the conviction or sentence rendered by a trial court in all criminal cases. 50 9 As a matter of general principle, the review mechanism has to be set in motion by one of the
parties. To have standing, the appellant must show that his rights or inter510
ests have been violated by the judgment from which appeal is taken.
501. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150 (1883).
502. Note, State Post-ConvictionAppeals, 61 COLUM. L.R. 681 (1961).
503. Id.
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 379-83 (1978) [hereinafter
ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, s'upra note 458, at 33.
A. CAMPBELL, supra note 504, at 196.

504. A.
505.

506.

cited as CAMPBELL].

507. Id.
508. Set CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 374, 387, 392, 397.
509. As to reviewability of decisions on petty offenses, see notes 389-98 supra and accompanying text.
510. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 374. The following parties have the right to appeal
decisions of the trial court: a public prosecutor, a private prosecutor, a subsidiary prosecutor, a
civil plaintiff, and a defendant. Id. arts. 35-71. A public prosecutor may also file an appeal in
favor of the defendant; a subsidiary prosecutor may appeal only a decision on guilt but not on a
sentence. The right to appeal by a civil plaintiff is even more limited. Id. arts. 374, 395-96.
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In at least two exceptional and narrowly defined situations the appellate court may review on its own motion decisions by the trial court. 51 I The
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is exercised either by the courts of
intermediate leyel (provincial courts) or by the Supreme Court, depending
51 2
on the level at which a case was tried.
The scope of review has been broadly defined. The CCP 51 3 identifies as
reversible errors:
(1) a violation of substantive law;
(2) a violation of the rules of criminal
procedure if it might have
51 4
had an impact on a decision;
(3) an error in fact-finding if it might have had an impact upon a
decision; and
(4) flagrant disproportionality of punishment or application or
failure to apply a "security measure or other measure. '"515
The reversible errors listed under (1) and (2) belong to a classical repertoire of appellate review since they are "legal" errors par excellence. A
category of reversible errors under (3) indicates that a reviewing tribunal
also checks the factual foundation of the decison by the trial court. This
category includes much more than review of convictions on the ground of
legally insufficient evidence. It obviously includes decisions contrary to the
weight of evidence as well as other decisions on guilt or on the sentence
based on factual errors.
Sentencing decisions are closely reviewed by appellate courts. Legality
of the decisions falls within the reviewing power under headings (1) and (2),
their factual foundations under heading (3), and their reasonableness in
terms of severity/leniency under heading (4). "Flagrant disproportionality"
of punishment should be assessed by standards set forth in the criminal
code. 5 16 A sentence may be "flagrantly disproportionate" either by being
too lenient or too severe.
An appellate brief should be filed by an appellant at a prescribed time
and in a prescribed manner with a trial court. The trial court subsequently
transfers the brief with the entire record of trial proceedings to the appellate
court; 5 17 the appellate court generally holds a hearing. 5 18 Additonal evidence at this stage may be admitted. 5 19 After a summary of the case is
520
presented by one of the judges, parties may argue the case orally.
Representation by lawyers is generally allowed 52 1 and in certain cases is
even required. The appellate court may: affirm the judgment; reverse it and
511.
512.
513.
514.
had an
merit a
515.

Id. at arts. 383-84.
Id. at arts. 17-18.
Id. at arts. 387-88.
A violation of a procedural rule entails reversal only if such a violation "might have
impact upon a decision" however, the most serious violations listed in CCP., art. 388
reversal regardless of the consequences.
As to "preventive measures" see CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 99-104.

516. M. LIPCZYNSKA, POLSKI PROCES KARNY 330 (1975).

517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 377.
Id. at art. 399.
Id. at art. 402.
Id. at art. 403.
Id. at art. 407.
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remand the case for a new trial; or change the judgment, ze., vacate the
judgment below and decide the case on the merits. The latter type of ruling
by the appellate court deserves some elaboration. It may be rendered only
522
A
when evidence gathered is sufficient to decide the case on the merits.
decision changing judgment of the trial court to the detriment of the defendant may issue only under the condition that an appeal to his detriment was
filed.

523

The appellate court may decide the case on the merits based on its own
fact findings, which may be, of course, radically different from facts found by
the trial court. A new, independent finding of fact by the appellate court
may be made either on the basis of the evidence produced before the trial
524
A decision on
court, the evidence admitted at the appellate level, or both.
the merits may also issue without any independent fact-finding by the review
tribunal. That is, the appellate court may agree with the findings made
below, but give them a different legal assessment.
Appellate decision making on the merits contains a potential for radical
changes to the defendant's harm. An appellate court of the intermediate
level may even convict a defendant who was acquitted by a trial court. Any
appellate court may convict the defendant of a more grievous crime than the
one the defendant was convicted of by the trial court and may also increase
the sentence imposed by the court below. 525 Such rulings are not subject to
a further review under the CCP. 5 26 As already mentioned, the appellate
court may change the judgment below to the detriment of the defendant
only if an appeal was filed "to his detriment." Accordingly, upon retrial, an
originally imposed sentence may not be increased unless a previous decision
527
The foregoing safewas appealed "to the detriment" of the defendant.
guards do not apply to a mere reclassificaton of an offense under a more
severe statute. Moreover, they do not apply to the application of "security
measures" such as confinement in a mental hospital ("criminal commitment"). 528 Therefore, the defendant, by exercising his right to appeal, may
bring upon himself a substantial loss of liberty or reputation.
The strongest doubts about the fairness of the Polish appellate review
system arise with regard to the broad powers given appellate courts to decide
on the merits to the detriment of the defendant. In such a situation, the
appellate court assumes the role of the trial court, especially when it substitutes its own findings of fact for the ones made at the trial level. Since these
decisions are final, the defendant is in effect deprived of the right to have his
529
The.prohibition
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.
522. Id. at art. 386.
523. Id. at art. 383.
524. Id. at arts. 386, 402. For a criticism of the prevailing rules see A. KAFrAL, SYSTEM
SRODKOW ODWOLAWACZYCH W POLSKIM PROCESIE KARNYM 145 (1972).

525. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 383.
526. A mechanism of discretionary review of final decisions may be set in motion only by
the three top legal offices. CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 462-73. As to a possibility of reopening of
criminal cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence, see arts. 474-83.
527. Id. at arts. 383-408.
528. Mazur, supra note 348, at 548.
529. A. KAF-rAL, supra note 524, at 146.
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of reformatio inpeius, arguably implied by article 14, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, has been implemented by the Polish CCP only partially. That the
defendant may bring upon himself a substantial loss of liberty or reputation
by exercising his right to appeal is undeniable. 530 Finally, the absence of the
right to appeal in cases of petty administrative offenses is not beyond reproach. One can argue that article 14, paragraph 5 does not apply to these
offenses, since under Polish law they are not classified as "crimes." The argument is not compelling. Generally, in the area of human rights, technical
classification offered by municipal law rarely, if ever, should be dispositive.
Whether the particular offenses are "crimes" for the purposes of article 14,
paragraph 5, should be decided on the basis of the severity of sanctions and
the stigma attached to them. Since many of them carry the potential for loss
of liberty and at least some involve substantial stigmatization, 53 ' the right to
appeal is strongly suggested.

530. Id. at 66-69.
531. For a critical assessment of the lack of appellate review, see S. WOLTOS, supra note 108,
at 326-35.

